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TWO EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON MUTUAL THRIFT CONVERSIONS 
Chris Swift, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 2009 
Adviser: Gordon V. Karels 
In our first essay, we study initial returns and long-run performance of a unique 
sample of recently converted mutual-to-stock thrifts. Since the average converted thrift in 
underpriced, we are able to characterize investor behavior in a way that is not possible 
with the typical IPO. In particular, we find that after removing large returns cumulative 
excess returns are positive for the first 12 months after the IPO. Beginning in the second 
year, the average firm undergoes a significant price correction that lasts for 
approximately 18 months which produces negative cumulative abnormal returns for up to 
five years post-issue. Differences in risk-adjusted returns also indicate negative long-run 
returns, with poor performance concentrated in the second and third years following the 
IPO. The return differences are most pronounced among the small thrifts in our sample, 
and are broadly consistent with investor overreaction at the time of the IPO that continues 
for six to twelve months before prices begin reverting back to fundamental value. 
In our second essay, we examine full conversions, MHCs and second-stage 
conversions for significant differences in agency costs across ownership structures and 
possible implications for second-stage conversions. Full conversions undertake more 
lending risk and are more efficient with respect to asset utilization. All ownership 
structures experience over-capitalization following the IPO. MHCs and second-stage 
conversions return temporary greater valuation to shareholders. Large mutual thrifts that 
are inefficient with respect to asset utilization are more likely to choose a MHC.  In 
       
 
 
addition, MHCs that report lower price-to-book and are more costly to operate choose 
second-stage conversions. Publicly traded thrifts that report higher price-to-book and 
greater ROAA are acquired. Small MHCs with high asset utilization and higher operating 
costs are more likely to choose second-stage conversions. Large MHCs that report lower 
price –to-book are more likely to choose second-stage conversions. Small publicly traded 
thrifts that are acquired report lower interest income to average assets but higher price-to-
book while large publicly traded thrifts report both greater interest income to average 
assets and price-to-book. 
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Introduction 
The IPO market is a natural place to examine aggregate investor behavior 
following a large, discrete stock price change, since the average IPO has a first day return 
of between 10% and 20% (depending on the time period examined).  The cause of the 
large initial returns is not well understood. Some suggest that the large initial returns 
result from initial undervaluation, in which case the first-day return simply reflects an 
adjustment from the offer price to the fundamental value.  Others suggest that initial 
returns reflect investor overreaction to new information on the first day of trading.
1
  
Ritter and Welch (2002) also document that positive first-day returns are followed 
by long-run underperformance.    One explanation is that negative long-run returns are 
the result of overreaction to new information on the initial day of trading: Overreaction 
drives prices above fundamental value, but in the long-run prices converge to 
fundamental value, and the long-run abnormal returns (excluding the first-day return) are 
negative.
2
 However, negative long-run returns can be attributed to investor overreaction 
only if one knows that the IPO was not initially overvalued.  Recent work by 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) suggests that IPOs are actually overvalued at 
issue by as much as 50%.  In light of this statistic, one cannot attribute the negative long-
run returns to post-IPO investor overreaction, since they may simply result from initial 
over-pricing.   
                                                 
1 We do not equate “underpricing” with the initial return, as is commonly done in the literature.  We refer to 
first day returns as such, and use the term “underpricing” only to refer to situations where the IPO price is 
known to below the firm‟s fundamental value (described in more detail below). 
2 Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest it may also reflect a failure to adequately control for firm characteristics. 
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We contribute to the study of post-IPO investor overreaction by studying the 
long-run return properties of a unique set of 221 thrifts that converted from mutual to 
stock form between 1993 and 2000.  When thrifts convert from mutual to stock 
ownership, the original owners (depositors) lose their ownership rights and their entire 
claim on pre-conversion equity is transferred to the IPO investors at no cost. 3  Thus, the 
new shareholders have ownership rights that include all IPO proceeds plus all of the pre-
conversion market value of the thrift.  In contrast, the new shareholders in a typical IPO 
have a claim on only a proportion of the pre-conversion market value.  If we assume 
positive pre-conversion market value, then by construction the converting thrift IPO is 
underpriced. In other words, it is not possible for the valuation to be „correct‟ since IPO 
investors always receive assets (IPO proceeds plus pre-conversion market value) worth 
more than the IPO proceeds.  Peter Lynch once remarked that from the perspective of the 
IPO investor, this was equivalent to buying a house, moving in, and finding the seller had 
left the sale proceeds in the house for the buyer to keep (Wilcox and Williams, 1998).  
Many investors understand ex ante that this underpricing exists and is unique to thrift 
demutualizations, although the exact magnitude is not observable.  It is not a feature of 
standard IPOs, bank IPOs or insurance company demutualizations.  
                                                 
3 Prior to conversion, mutual thrift depositors are fixed claimants with apparent ownership rights to residual 
equity. However, Smith and Underwood (1997) discuss that although the residual profits of a mutual thrift 
belong collectively to depositors, they are individually unable to exercise their rights as equityholders. In 
other words, mutual depositors are unable to withdraw the mutual thrift‟s residual profits.   If the thrift 
converts to a stock organization using the sale-of-stock method, depositors have priority in purchasing 
shares in proportion to their deposited assets.  Depositors who choose not to purchase shares are no longer 
owners but simply fixed claimants with no ownership rights. 
 
4 
 
 
The following example illustrates how the built-in underpricing is unique to 
mutual-to-stock thrift IPOs. Assume two thrifts that are identical except one is privately 
held and one is organized as a mutual. Without loss of generality, assume the private firm 
has 100,000 shares; mutual thrifts do not have ownership shares.  Further assume that 
both firms have $500,000 of book value equity prior to their IPO and that both firms will 
raise capital by selling 400,000 shares to outside investors. The key difference is that the 
new shareholders of the mutual thrift have a claim on all pre-conversion equity while the 
new shareholders of the private thrift have a claim on only a proportion of pre-conversion 
equity. 
The current owner of the private thrift owns all 100,000 shares and will sell 
400,000 new shares (80% of the company) for expansion resulting in 500,000 shares after 
the offering. Investment bankers assist the owner in determining the market valuation of 
the company and estimate the post-conversion market value to be approximately 
$5,000,000; the IPO is fairly priced by setting the issue price at $10 per share. This 
means the company will collect approximately $4,000,000 when the shares are sold (less 
investment banking fees), and the tangible per share book value of the firm will rise from 
$5.00 prior to the IPO to $9.00 after.
4
 Moreover, assuming that the estimated market 
value of $5,000,000 is correct, the post-conversion per share market value equals the 
initial price of $10.   
                                                 
4 This represents an immediate increase in pro forma tangible book value of $4.00 per share to the existing 
shareholder and an immediate dilution of $1.00 per share to new shareholders. Thus, new shareholders are 
investing approximately $1.00 in the present value of growth opportunities of the thrift.  While smaller in 
magnitude, this is consistent with the results of Chung, Li, and Yu (2005) who document that a large 
percentage of the IPO offer price reflects the present value of growth opportunities.  
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 The mutual-to-stock IPO involves selling 400,000 shares at the IPO price of $10, 
with stock proceeds (less fees) of approximately $4,000,000. In contrast to the private-to-
stock conversion, the original owners (depositors) have no shares in the converted firm 
and are effectively stripped of their claim on pre-conversion equity. The pro forma 
tangible book value per share following the IPO is $11.25 which represents an immediate 
increase of $1.25 or 12.5% to new shareholders.  A post-conversion market value of 
$5,000,000 results in a share price of $12.50, and the IPO is therefore underpriced at 
issue by approximately 25%. In other words, a mutual-to-stock thrift conversion results in 
a direct transfer of wealth to new shareholders at the expense of the original owners 
(depositors). In fact, as long as the pre-conversion market value of the firm is positive at 
the time of conversion, Colantuoni (1998) demonstrates that the IPO will be underpriced 
and a transfer of wealth will occur regardless of the IPO offer price.  
 The above example illustrates why we know the average issue is not overpriced 
and why our sample of firms is uniquely suited to test for investor overreaction.  For 
example, since negative abnormal returns can occur only after price rises above 
fundamental value, any negative long-run risk-adjusted returns observed in our sample 
must result from investor overreaction to information at some point after the IPO, 
assuming the thrift was solvent prior to conversion. In particular, negative long-run 
returns relative to the first-day closing price indicate investor overreaction on the initial 
trading day. In contrast, if investors initially underreact to information, all long-returns 
will be positive when measured relative to the first-day closing price.  Over-reaction after 
6 
 
 
the initial trading day will produce negative returns only during the later, post-issue sub-
periods when prices correct.   
We find that our sample of converting thrifts demonstrates large first day excess 
returns of 17.9 percent; however, even the large magnitude of this initial return need not 
imply investor overreaction or initial underpricing.  Thus, we examine post-IPO 
cumulative abnormal returns (which exclude the large initial return) to gauge whether 
investors overreact on the day of the IPO.  We find positive cumulative abnormal returns 
over the first twelve months following the IPO, but negative cumulative abnormal returns 
at all horizons longer than that.  The results suggest that investors overreact on the initial 
day and possibly during the subsequent 12 months of trading, which is consistent with the 
results of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004).  
If prices eventually converge to fundamental value, any overreaction must be 
followed by negative sub-period returns during a corrective phase.  Therefore, analyzing 
sub-period returns provides insight into the specific timing of overreaction and 
subsequent correction.  We examine returns over six month sub-periods for five years 
post IPO, looking at both market adjusted excess returns and alphas from the various 
factor models mentioned above.  Excess returns are significantly positive for the first six 
months after the IPO, and approximately zero in the subsequent six-month period.  This 
suggests that overreaction continues for approximately six months beyond the initial day 
of trading.  It is worth emphasizing that although investors overreact during the first six 
months of trading, nearly all of the overreaction occurs on the initial day of trading. 
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However, within twelve months following the IPO, the average thrift begins to 
experience a price correction or mean reversion towards fundamental value, as measured 
by negative excess sub-period returns. This correction lasts for approximately eighteen 
months, after which time the sub-period excess returns are approximately zero.  Thus, the 
thrifts in our sample appear to go through a cycle of overreaction and subsequent 
correction after the IPO.  The initial day of trading, as well as the first six months after 
the IPO, are characterized by investor overreaction.  Prices stabilize during the following 
six-month period then begin a correction process which lasts about eighteen months.  We 
also examine differences in risk-adjusted returns. While the statistical significance of 
these results is somewhat weaker, they also demonstrate that the long-run abnormal 
returns are negative, and that the poor performance is concentrated in the second and 
third years following the IPO. In addition, the return differences are most pronounced 
among the smaller thrifts in the sample.   
Our study is among the first to examine the long-run performance of these 
converted thrifts in detail.
5
  Our study is similar to recent work by Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004), who interpret empirical data from standard IPOs in light of various 
                                                 
5 Two exceptions are Ritter (1991) and Houge and Loughran (1999), though neither of those studies 
analyzes the returns for thrifts separately from other financial institutions.  Ritter (1991) documents long-
run overperformance over a three holding period for financial institutions (banks and thrifts) that went 
public during the period 1975-1984. In contrast, Houge and Loughran (1999) found that a sample of banks 
and thrifts that went public from 1983-1991 significantly underperformed over a five year holding period.  
In addition, initial thrift returns have been examined by Pettigrew, Page, Jahera, Barth (1999) and Wilcox 
and Williams (1998).  Maksimovic and Unal (1993) study the relation between IPO pricing, first-day 
returns, and depositor and insider purchases, and find that greater insider ownership predicted higher initial 
returns.  Esty (1997) and Kroszner and Strahan (1996) examine regulatory incentives to convert to stock 
form.  Unal (1997) looks at the appraisal process and how it relates to initial IPO windfall gains.  Masulis 
(1987) looks at probability a firm will convert as a function of thrift size, recent growth and non-interest 
income.  Cole and Mehran (1998) study the performance of converted thrifts before and after expiration of 
anti-takeover amendments. 
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behavioral models.  Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) examine the pre-market, first 
day and long-run performance of a large set of IPOs.  They find that relative to industry 
peers, the median IPO is overvalued at the offer by about 50% relative to its industry 
peers.  Moreover, the most overvalued IPOs earn the highest first day returns, and 
experience the most severe subsequent long-run performance. Relative to IPOs that are 
initially underpriced, the IPOs most initially overvalued earn first day returns that are 5% 
to 7% higher, but earn 20% to 40% lower returns over the next 5 years.  Their results 
suggest that the widely documented long-term IPO underperformance may be attributable 
to both the initial overvaluation of the offerings, followed by further post-issue price 
increases that eventually reverse over the long-run.  The authors interpret their evidence 
as being consistent with initial investor overreaction to information (measured by the 
initial overvaluation of the IPO), followed by additional subsequent overreaction (large 
positive first-day returns), and long term mean-reversion (long-term underperformance).  
This interpretation is consistent with the empirical predictions of Daniel et al. (1998). 
 While their study addresses several important questions, it raises others. First, it is 
unclear that overpricing in the pre-market can be interpreted as the type of investor 
overreaction modeled in Daniel et al. (1998).  This is because the pre-issue pricing 
mechanism differs from the open market pricing mechanism:  The initial offer price is set 
by the issuer and underwriter, and only indirectly represents investor demand.  If the 
issuer miscalculates investor demand, or faces incentives that affect the offer price, the 
pre-offer pricing mechanism may not accurately represent aggregate investor demand.  
One advantage of our sample is that the pre-issue pricing mechanism for thrifts is highly 
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transparent.  The initial valuation pricing formula is regulated, is common knowledge to 
investors, and is distinctly independent of investor sentiment.  Thus, investor demand 
manifests only in the after-market. 
Second, if the average IPO is initially overpriced, then one cannot know whether 
long-run negative returns are due to investor overreaction or simply result from the initial 
overpricing.  The second advantage of our sample of thrifts is that underpricing is known 
ex ante to many market participants.  Thus, any negative excess returns can be attributed 
to investor overreaction sometime after the IPO.  The empirical tests in the paper are 
based upon this simple insight. 
 
I.      Thrift conversion process 
A. Regulatory Process for Thrift Conversions 
The thrift industry is comprised of both stock and mutual forms of ownership. 
Mutual organizations are owned by depositors whereas stock thrifts are owned by 
shareholders. Until the early 1980s, the thrift industry was dominated by mutual 
ownership. For example, Esty (1997) reports that in 1979 stock thrifts held only 25% of 
thrift industry assets. Chaddad and Cook (2004) note that deregulation and 
macroeconomic forces, such as increased interest rate volatility during the 1980‟s, 
changed the competitive environment in which thrifts operate. Mutual thrifts were most 
vulnerable to these industry shocks since mutual thrifts rely on retained earnings as their 
only source of capital.  
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 Prior to 1982, stock ownership for a federally chartered thrift was not an 
ownership structure option. In response to a large number of failed thrifts, laws were 
changed authorizing stock ownership and mutual-to-stock conversions. To promote stock 
ownership, Congress passed the Garn-St Germain Depository Act of 1982, which 
legalized stock ownership and mutual-to-stock conversions for federally chartered thrifts. 
These changes were successful in attracting mutual thrifts to convert to stock ownership; 
Chaddad and Cook (2004) report that stock thrifts currently hold approximately 90% of 
industry assets. 
 The primary regulator of thrift institutions is the Office of Thrift Supervision.  
The current „sale-of-stock‟ conversion process was adopted by the predecessor to the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), in 1974.
6
 
This process provides for the sale of stock of the converting thrift at a price equal to its 
pro forma market value as determined by an independent appraisal. The sale-of-stock 
approach was selected since the FHLBB viewed it as the most viable way of minimizing 
windfall distributions to accountholders (Smith and Underwood (1997)).  
 A mutual-to-stock conversion begins with the thrift‟s board of directors drafting 
and adopting a plan of conversion. The plan of conversion must include subscription 
priorities, limits on maximum purchases (generally five percent), provision for the 
                                                 
6 The current sale-of-stock approach was preceded by the free-distribution-of-stock approach that was in 
force from 1961-63 (Unal (1997)). The free-distribution-of-stock approach required that the converting 
thrift‟s preconversion equity by distributed on a pro rata basis to existing depositors. As noted by Unal 
(1997), this approach caused numerous problems and was criticized on the grounds that it would result in a 
windfall to depositors. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board responded by placing a moratorium on free-
distribution-of-stock conversions in 1963 followed by a Congressional statutory moratorium on 
conversions in April 1973 (Unal (1997)). 
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liquidation account and pro forma market valuation of the institution, and additional 
limits on stock purchases by officers and directors.  Once the board approves the 
conversion plan, the thrift prepares to file its application for approval (Form AC). Form 
AC consists of the conversion plan, an independent appraisal establishing market value of 
the thrift, and the proxy statement. The proxy statement includes the thrift‟s current 
financial statements.  
 The independent appraisal is prepared with respect to regulatory guidelines. An 
independent appraiser, hired by management, establishes the market value for the 
converting thrift immediately following conversion by comparing the converting thrift 
with a sample of similar publicly traded thrifts while considering the thrift‟s intended use 
of the proceeds.
7
  A minimum and maximum range for the firm‟s value is computed and 
reported as 15% above and below the estimated value after conversion. Management 
selects the offer size from within this range (Unal (1997)) and thus has some control over 
the degree of underpricing.  This is consistent with the results of Maksimovic and Unal 
(1993), who find evidence that issue size and underpricing are directly related, and Cagle 
and Porter (1997) state that management may be likely to underprice thrift conversion 
IPOs.  However, the choice of issue size will not introduce overpricing even if 
management chooses an issue size 15% above the appraised value, since pre-conversion 
equity is always transferred to IPO investors at no cost. 
                                                 
7 As noted in Pettigrew et al. (1999), some regulatory authorities have expressed concerns that the appraisal 
value has frequently been set to low.  If true, this will serve to increase the degree of underpricing, and 
therefore not affect the validity of using abnormal returns to make inferences about post-IPO investor 
behavior. 
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 Following the submission of a complete application, regulatory authorities review 
the Form AC and give comments on the adequacy of the appraisal, the legal sufficiency 
of the plan and disclosures, and the accuracy of the accounting. Once the application for 
conversion is approved, the thrift immediately distributes its proxy statement to members. 
After a period of 20 to 45 days, the thrift can hold its special meeting of account holders. 
The plan must be approved by a majority of the outstanding votes of members unless 
state law requires a higher percentage for state chartered institutions. As previously 
stated, the stock offering follows the sale-of-stock approach. The sale-of-stock approach 
gives depositors and managers the first opportunity to purchase shares (Unal (1997)). If 
the conversion offering is not oversubscribed, then subscription rights go to members of 
the thrift who were not eligible depositors or shares are sold to the public.  
 The FHLBB adopted amendments in 1979 to limit management purchases, which 
had averaged 34% of the total stock sold (Smith and Underwood (1997)). Management 
purchases were limited to 25%-35% (depending on size of the thrift) in the aggregate and 
managers were restricted from selling any shares purchased in the initial subscription for 
a period of one year (Wilcox (2006)).
8
 These amendments also limited maximum 
purchases from any person to 5% (Smith and Underwood (1997)).  The subscription 
rights are nontransferable and can only be exercised by the recipient. Regulations prohibit 
anyone directly or indirectly from acquiring ownership of more than ten percent of the 
conversion stock without board approval.  
 
                                                 
8 Cole and Mehran (1998) find that after the expiration of this lock-up period, managers of the average firm 
subsequently increased their ownership percentages. 
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B.       The Nature of Built-in Underpricing 
 A key feature that differentiates a thrift conversion from the typical IPO is that at 
the time of conversion, the depositors are stripped of their claim on pre-conversion equity 
and the claim is automatically transferred to the new shareholders. Since, the net 
proceeds of the IPO simply become an asset of the converted thrift, IPO investors have a 
claim to both pre-conversion market value and all proceeds from the stock sale.  In other 
words, the IPO investors have a claim on total pre-conversion market value at no cost to 
them. To formalize, suppose an economically solvent mutual thrift applies for conversion 
to stock ownership.  Utilizing the model developed by Maksimovic and Unal (1993, p. 
1664), let oV  represent the value of pre-conversion equity and let oGV  measure the 
present value of pre-conversion growth opportunities. The pre-conversion market value 
of the thrift is given by: 
  oP GVVV  0  
Wilcox and Williams (1998) show that solvency implies that  
PV  is positive.
 9
 
                                                 
9 A distinction must be made between the book value and market value of pre-conversion equity, both of 
which are relevant in the context of the converting firm.  Regulatory decisions, including decisions to close 
or rehabilitate a thrift are based upon book values, whereas for shareholders the relevant measure of value 
is the firm‟s market value.  This distinction ultimately blurs prior to the conversion, since the market value 
of firm equity is unobservable.  Kane and Unal (1990) present a model for market-value/book-value 
relationships for financial institutions. The pre-conversion market value can be viewed as the sum of the 
market value of both unbooked equity and booked equity. If book value is assumed to be an unbiased 
estimate of market value, booked equity is the pre-conversion net worth of the converting thrift, and thus an 
appropriate estimate of pre-conversion market value. 
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In addition to the IPO proceeds, denoted IPOV , the class of investors purchasing 
the newly issued shares also receives 100% ownership of the pre-conversion market 
value at no cost.  The fundamental value of the thrift after conversion equals  
   KVVV IPOPT       
 (1) 
where K denotes issuance costs.  In an efficient market, the post-conversion market value 
will equal the fundamental value, defined in equation (1), and the first-day price change 
will equal the fundamental value minus the issue price IPOV . 
Let Pday1 denote the market value at the end of the first day of trading.  If 
investors are rational, first day trading will drive the market price from the issue price, 
IPOV , to fundamental value TV , so that Pday1 = TV .  Under-reaction may produce a 
positive return that results in a first day closing price Pday1 < TV , while over-reaction will 
result in Pday1 > TV .  Thus, the presence of a positive first day return by no means 
indicates investor overreaction, though it may provide an incentive for momentum 
trading in the new issue.   
Equation (1) illustrates the underpricing built into thrift conversions.  Thrift IPO 
investors pay IPOV  and receive assets worth KVVV IPOPT  . Thus, in addition to a 
claim on the IPO proceeds themselves, IPO investors also receive a claim on the full pre-
conversion market value.  As a result, the initial underpricing is equal to the pre-
conversion value of the firm 
PV -K. This term is almost certain to be positive for an 
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economically solvent thrift that converts to stock using the sale of stock method (Masulis 
(1987), Barth, Brumbaugh, and Kleidon (1994) and Unal (1997)).  In other words, if the 
pre-conversion thrift is solvent, underpricing is unavoidable.  For this reason, 
Maksimovic and Unal (1993) note that, unlike the typical IPO, a thrift conversion may 
experience subsequent price appreciation even without informational asymmetries.  
Wilcox and Williams (1998) find that size of excess first-day returns is highly predictable 
using pre-conversion firm value.
10
 
The near certainty of excess returns to participants of thrift conversions has not 
escaped regulatory attention. As discussed in Colantuoni (1998), the Office of Thrift 
Supervison‟s (1994) guidelines seek to eliminate windfall gains on IPOs by setting the 
expected post-conversion stock price equal to the IPO price, that is, IPOT VV  .  Of 
course, this is impossible except under the following restrictive conditions: (a) the pre-
conversion market value of the firm is zero; or (b) IPO proceeds are invested in negative 
NPV projects; or (c) the conversion and issuance fees exceed the pre-conversion market 
value.
 11
   Otherwise, IPOT VV  , the post-issue market value exceeds the IPO price, IPOV , 
and the issue is underpriced. 
                                                 
10 Both Wilcox and Williams (1998) and Colantuoni (1998), utilizing public information available at the 
time of conversion, present evidence illustrating the predictive nature of excess first-day returns. The 
explanatory variable used by Wilcox and Williams (1998) is the ratio pre-conversion equity (book value) to 
appraised value while Colantuoni (1998) uses the ratio pre-conversion equity (book value) to total assets. 
The results reported by both show that pre-conversion equity (book value) is highly significant in 
explaining initial returns. 
 
11 See Maksimovic and Unal (1993), Unal (1997), Colantuoni (1998), and Wilcox and Williams (1998) for 
detailed treatments of this issue. 
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Some behavioral theories predict that in environments with large single-day 
returns, investors may be prone to overreaction which drives prices above fundamental 
value.  Daniel et al. (1998) predict initial investor overreaction, followed by additional 
subsequent overreaction and then mean reversion.  In our setting, their model predicts 
large, positive first-day returns, positive abnormal returns for a period after the issue, and 
negative abnormal returns during the mean-reversion period.  In addition, initial 
overreaction will lead to negative long-run returns relative to the first-day closing price. 
In contrast, the models of Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) 
predict initial investor underreaction, followed by subsequent overreaction and later 
reversion to fundamental value.  Like the Daniel et al. (1998) model, these theories 
predict positive first-day returns, positive abnormal returns for a period after the issue, 
and negative abnormal returns during the mean-reversion period.  However, because 
investors initially underreact to information, all long-returns will be positive when 
measured relative to the first-day closing price.  Excess negative returns will exist only 
during the later, post-issue sub-periods.  Lastly, if investors never over-react to 
information, one will observe positive or zero abnormal returns over all post-issue sub-
periods.  The next section examines post-IPO returns in detail. 
 
II.        Data and methodology 
Figure 1 presents four different scenarios of investor reaction at the IPO and in the 
aftermarket. The four scenarios depict initial investor under- or overreaction to an IPO 
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and eventual reversion of price to fundamental value. Scenario 1 displays initial 
underreaction followed by slow convergence to fundamental value with no overreaction. 
Scenario 2 also depicts initial underreaction, followed by subsequent overreaction and 
eventual convergence to fundamental value.  Scenario 2 is consistent with the Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) models.  Scenario 3 displays 
initial investor overreaction, followed by subsequent mean reversion to fundamental 
value.  Scenario 4 displays initial overreaction, followed by additional subsequent 
overreaction, and eventual convergence to fundamental value. Scenario 4 is consistent 
with Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
    Figure 1 Here 
Our first task is to establish that the average thrift in our sample is not overpriced 
at the issue, which implies that any negative excess returns during the post-IPO period 
must reflect investor overreaction at some point after the IPO.   
 
A.  Sample Construction and Summary Statistics 
 We utilize a sample of thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock 
ownership during the period between 1993 and 2000.  We begin with 1993 since Barth, 
Brumbaugh and Kleidon (1994) state that between 1980 and 1990, many thrifts were 
poorly capitalized following conversion and were eventually seized by regulators. In 
addition to poor capitalization, the converted thrifts pursued excessive growth strategies 
or paid excessive dividends or salaries. Thrifts that converted in the 1990s were better 
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capitalized.  Our sample ends in 2000, because some of our empirical tests require five 
years of post-IPO return data. 
To construct a survivor-bias free sample set of converting thrifts to measure risk-
adjusted performance, our sample begins with a listing of 351 firms that filed applications 
for conversion with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board during 1993 - 2000.
12
  From this 
list, we eliminate all non-publicly traded firms, leaving a sample of 221 firms.  The split-
adjusted offer price was provided by SNL Securities. Daily returns for the five years 
following conversion are determined using the CRSP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ files.  
In addition, the Fama and French factors were obtained from Ken French‟s website.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample of converting firms. Similar to 
the results in Pettigrew, Page, Jahera and Barth (1999) and Wilcox and Williams (1998), 
we document an average first-day return of approximately18 percent for the thrifts in our 
sample. The cumulative return for days two through five is not significantly different 
from zero. Thus, the momentum from the initial day of trading does not appear to carry 
over into return for the next four days.  
Initial underpricing requires a positive pre-conversion market value.  We assume 
that the average thrift has positive pre-conversion market value, but because our sample 
firms do not trade prior to the IPO, we cannot observe the initial market value VP.  
However, there are several reasons to believe that this assumption is reasonable.  First, 
both Wilcox and Williams (1998) and Colantuoni (1998) present evidence of a strong 
correlation between initial excess returns and pre-conversion book value. Moreover, as 
                                                 
12 We thank SNL Securities for the list of firms. 
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Unal (1997) notes, it would be difficult to rationalize an investment in an ex ante 
overpriced firm, since the rational consequence of such overpricing is an immediate loss 
of investor capital from the negative initial return.
13
  Consistent with average initial 
underpricing, 214 of our 221 firms have positive initial returns.  
We also examine pre-conversion tangible book value.  Table I reports statistics on 
IPO proceeds, and pre-conversion tangible book value of equity (pro forma book tangible 
value minus IPO proceeds).  The average IPO raises approximately $55 million, with a 
pre-conversion tangible book value of $21 million; the median IPO raises just under $24 
million, and has a pre-conversion tangible book value of approximately $9 million.  On 
average, the ratio of pre-conversion book value to IPO proceeds is 45% (median value 
40%).  All but one of the 221 firms in our sample had positive tangible book value, again 
supporting the assumption that the average firm is underpriced at conversion.  Thus, 
while we cannot explicitly measure the firms‟ pre-IPO market values, these results 
support the assumption that average firm in our sample is underpriced.
14 
 
                                                 
13 Such overpayment might be rational if investors viewed the firm as a gamble, where overpayment is 
simply the price of admission to the casino. 
14 Of the 7 firms with negative returns, 5 have returns that are less than 5% in absolute value, and the firm 
with the lowest first day return faced subsequent lawsuits alleging that the firm misrepresented its financial 
condition prior to the IPO. We keep all 221 firms in our sample, but verify that all of our results are 
qualitatively robust to excluding the seven firms with negative first-day returns. The largest negative return 
is associated with Carver Bancorp, which converted on October 25, 1994.  The stock was offered at $10 per 
share, and closed the first day of trading at $7.66 (split adjusted), for a negative 23.44% return.  Carver 
experienced financial difficulties prior to and after the conversion and the negative first-day return most 
likely reflects a negative value of equity in place prior to the conversion.  However, investors may not have 
been able to accurately assess the value of pre-conversion equity:  subsequent to its conversion Carver 
faced litigation alleging that the offering circular contained material omissions and misstatements, and 
settled a lawsuit in August 1998 related to these misstatements.  While this is an isolated and extreme 
event, we retain it as part of our sample to fully capture the cross-section of post-conversion thrift 
performance.   
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Even if pre-conversion equity is positive, it is possible that fees associated with 
the IPO will exceed the value of pre-conversion equity, thus eliminating initial 
underpricing. This is unlikely to be the case with our sample.  Ritter and Chen (2000) 
document that during the period 1995 to 1998 over 95 percent of IPOs raising between 
$20 to $80 million incurred investment banking commissions (fees) of 7 percent or less. 
Since the average pre-conversion equity in our sample is 45% of the IPO proceeds, the 
magnitude of IPO fees is too small to drive pre-conversion equity below zero and 
eliminate initial underpricing.
15
 
The remaining results in Table I indicate that the average firm has a closing bid-
ask spread of $0.43, declining from a high of $0.67 in 1993 to $0.27 in 2000.  Firm assets 
average $648 million, the average price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is 18.4, and the average 
price-to-book (P/B) ratio is 0.973.  The average thrift has a post-conversion market 
capitalization of $72.899 million, and an average daily trading volume of 112,600 shares.  
 
B. Benchmark Definition and Construction of Control Groups 
We analyze long-run excess performance on both an absolute and risk-adjusted 
basis.   Absolute excess performance is measured by calculating buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARS).  Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that when IPOs are measured against 
like size firms the long-run performance of IPOs is close to zero.  We therefore measure 
BHARS relative to four benchmarks:  the CRSP value-weighted index, SNL Thrift Index, 
                                                 
15We also hand collect data on IPO expenses for the first 15 thrifts (sorted alphabetically) in our sample to 
measure the magnitude of IPO fees. The average IPO fee as a percentage of total IPO proceeds was 3.53% 
with a maximum of 6.61% and a minimum of 2.35%.  IPO expenses for our sample of thrifts appear to be 
consistent with the results of Chen and Ritter (2000). 
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and two control groups of size-matched thrifts. The SNL Thrift Index is a non-traded 
equal weighted index that tracks the total return of the seasoned thrift industry.
16
   
The control groups are calculated as follows:  For each converting thrift in our 
sample, we find the firm in the same industry with the closest market value in the year of 
conversion. To select the sample of matched firms, we first download all thrifts in 
Compustat for the period 1993-2000.  We use four-digit standard industry classification 
codes (SIC) of the converting thrifts to identify all firms in the thrift industry. From this 
sample, we eliminate all firms that are part of our sample of converting thrifts. The 
market values for all remaining firms are computed on December 31 for each sample 
year, then sorted by year to facilitate matching year of conversion and market value. 
These firms represent our control group candidates. Due to the regulated environment 
and the unique financial position of thrifts, we match only on industry and market 
capitalization. This parallels the practice used in the thrift appraisal process, where size 
and industry are two key criteria used to identify comparable firms.  The control group 
candidate with the market value closest to the sample firm is selected. Every candidate 
firm chosen is eliminated to avoid any reuse of control group candidates. In order to 
exclude initial day returns, the matching firm‟s IPO date must precede the converting 
thrift‟s IPO date.17  
                                                 
16 We thank SNL Securities for providing daily values for their Thrift Index. 
 
17 Not all thrift IPOs result from mutual-to-stock conversion.  Closely held thrifts and mutual holding 
companies can also convert to publicly traded thrifts.  Neither of these types of IPO are included in our 
primary sample of converting thrifts, but are included in the list of candidate firms for the control sample. 
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 We construct two control group samples, with the main difference being the 
length of time the control firms must exist prior to the converting thrift‟s IPO.  The two 
groups are constructed to balance two offsetting features of the data.  On the one hand, 
since we are trying to isolate the market dynamics of the converting thrifts shortly after 
their IPOs, we wish to eliminate all newly-public firms from the control group, so that 
they are not also experiencing post-IPO dynamics.  On the other hand, the thrift industry 
witnessed considerable consolidation during the sample period.  Of our primary sample 
of 221 firms, only 108 remain at the end of five years, with the majority of the 
disappearing firms acquired by larger banks or thrifts at a sizable acquisition premium.   
Imposing the requirement that all control thrifts be “well-seasoned” implicitly eliminates 
many firms from the control group that were themselves acquired at a premium, which 
reduces the average return for the control group. 
In constructing the first control group, we do not impose a waiting period from 
IPO date to be considered a match firm (we do require that the control firm is publicly 
traded at the time of the converting thrift‟s IPO). This construction methodology is 
similar to the methodology used by SNL Securities to construct the SNL Thrift Index.  
The second control group imposes the requirement that the matched control firm has been 
traded publicly for at least three years prior to the converting thrift‟s IPO date, which 
closely follows Ritter (1991).  
 Our sample of converting thrifts experienced numerous delistments over the five 
year holding period. Accordingly, it is important that we avoid survivorship bias with 
respect to our control group. To avoid survivorship bias, we follow Ritter (1991) and 
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select matching firms regardless of when they delist. As a result, our control group 
experiences delistments during the five year holding period similar to our sample of 
converting thrifts (reported in Table 3 below).  
Table 2 reports sample statistics on firm characteristics for the SNL Thrift Index 
and the two control firms. The average market capitalization for firms in the SNL Index 
is $218 million.  This is substantially larger than the average size of the converting thrifts, 
and is driven by the presence of several very large thrifts in the Index, including 
Washington Mutual, which had a market capitalization of $29 billion in 2000.  The 
median market cap for firms in the SNL Index is $47 million.  The average (median) 
market capitalization for control groups one and two are much closer to the sample of 
converting thrifts at $75 million ($33 million) and $135 million ($41 million), 
respectively.   
Average trading volume in the year of conversion is higher for the converting 
thrifts than either of the control groups or the SNL Index.  Bid-ask spread data is not 
available for the SNL Index, but the two control groups exhibit the same relative decline 
in spreads over the sample period, though the absolute level of the spread for the control 
groups is about twice the spread for the sample of converting thrifts.  Converting thrifts 
have an average (median) price-to-earnings ratio of 18.4 (15.1) compared to 14.1 (12.9) 
for the SNL Index, 14.1 (12.4) for control group 1 and 13.0 (11.5) for control group 2.  
Both the mean and median price-to-book ratio for converting thrifts is 0.97, compared to 
an average of 1.55 for the SNL Index and 1.02 for both control groups. 
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C.   Long-run Thrift Returns 
The most appropriate benchmark is rarely obvious in an event study.  However, 
our entire sample comes from the homogeneous thrift industry, and returns for this 
industry diverged quite substantially from the value-weighted CRSP index over the 
sample period (Figure 2).
18
  This suggests that BHARS relative to a broad market index 
may present a distorted view of true long-run thrift performance. While we calculate and 
report statistics relative to the market, the analysis and discussion below focuses on 
measures of excess performance relative to the SNL Thrift index and thrift control 
groups.  
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARS) are calculated according to  
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where it return on the stock i on day t ; T offer date + number trading days in 
sample sub-period, or delisting date, if sooner; and mt benchmark return day t . To 
exclude positive initial returns, we follow Carter, Dark, Singh (1998) and exclude the 
first five trading days from all long-run calculations.  Excess long-run performance is 
measured for up to five years following the date of conversion. A converted thrift is 
included for the lesser of the five years following conversion or the delisting date of the 
thrift.  
                                                 
18 Regressing returns for the SNL Thrift Index on the value-weighted CRSP index results in a factor 
loading for beta that is not significantly different from zero.  The returns for the SNL closely mirror the 
returns of other thrift indexes.  For example, data on the American Banker Thrift Index is available from 
1997 through 2005, and over this period the American Banker Thrift Index earned cumulative returns of 
303% versus 311% for the SNL Index. 
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Table 3 reports cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  To guard against 
survivorship bias, we first report buy-and-hold excess returns for all sample firms in 
Panel (a), calculated according to equation (2).  Thus, BHARS for all holding periods are 
calculated for all 221 firms.  If a firm delists prior to the end of the holding period, that 
firm‟s BHAR is calculated through the delisting date and is included in all subsequent 
time periods.  Several interesting observations emerge from Panel (a). First, mean and 
median cumulative abnormal returns are either zero or positive over the first twelve 
months.  Thus, in addition to the large first-day return (excluded from all calculations in 
Table 3), converting thrifts perform somewhat better than other thrifts in the first year 
after the IPO.   
Second, long-run performance becomes negative in year two and remains 
negative for up to five years, regardless of the thrift benchmark utilized.  For example, 
relative to the SNL Index the average cumulative return through the end of year two is -
13.41% (median -17.14%).  The corresponding average abnormal returns are -12.28% 
and -9.90% for control groups 1 and 2, respectively.  All of these differences are 
statistically and economically significant.   Cumulative abnormal returns continue to 
decline through month 30 before stabilizing through the end of the five-year sample 
period. We also report median returns in Table 3. The results indicate the median firm 
underperformed the average thrift with respect to cumulative long-run performance over 
the five-year holding period. This result is not unexpected given the thrift industry is 
characterized by many small firms that are overcapitalized with relatively low margins 
(American Banker, 2004). 
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Our sample of converting thrifts decreases by 113 firms over the 60 month 
holding period. The majority of these firms disappear because they are acquired. Panel 
(a) returns include the delist return associated with the acquisition.  In Panel (b), we 
report buy-and-hold abnormal returns only for those firms that survive to the end of each 
holding period, which eliminates all firms acquired during the sample period. Once again, 
the converted thrifts underperform all benchmarks over the five year holding period. The 
magnitude of underperformance relative to the SNL index is larger than reported in Panel 
(a).  This is simply because the average returns on acquired thrifts (including the takeover 
premium) are larger than the average returns on non-acquired thrifts during our sample 
period.  Panel (c) reports survivorship data for the converting thrifts and both control 
groups. Consistent with the objectives of using a control group methodology, both control 
groups experience levels of firm attrition similar to the converting thrifts.  As a result, the 
abnormal returns relative to the control groups are qualitatively similar between panels 
(a) and (b), particularly for control group one.   
The negative long-run returns from Table 3 suggests that investor behavior on the 
initial day and subsequent 12 months of trading causes prices to rise above fundamental 
value.  To identify specific sub-periods of under and overperformance during the five-
year holding period, we calculate buy-and-hold excess returns for 6-month interim 
periods over the post-IPO sample. The results, presented in Table 4, indicate that the 
sample of converted thrifts continues to earn excess positive returns for the six months 
after the IPO.  These returns are statistically significant relative to the two control groups, 
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but insignificant when measured relative the SNL Index.  The excess returns over the [7, 
12] month sub-period are not significantly different from zero. 
The most striking results from Table 4 are the excess returns over the [13, 18], 
[19, 24] and [25, 30] month sub-periods.  The average (median) thrift underperforms the 
SNL Index by 4.71% (6.53%), 5.39% (6.31%) and 2.90% (3.90%) in these three periods, 
respectively. The magnitude of the underperformance is slightly larger relative to either 
of the control groups.  These returns are consistent with price correction of investor 
overreaction during the initial trading day and immediate [5 days, 6 months] sub-period.  
Interestingly, the time-horizons over which this mean-reversion occurs is roughly the 
same as the mean-reversion horizon associated with the momentum effect first 
documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate overreaction in the first day 
of trading (evidenced by negative cumulative post-IPO returns in Table 3), with some 
evidence of overreaction during the immediate post-conversion period (evidenced by the 
positive sub-period return in the sub-period 5 days, 6 months).  This overreaction largely 
corrects itself over the subsequent 24-month period, after which time the abnormal 
returns on converted thrifts not significantly different from zero. 
 
III. Controlling for Risk of Converted Thrifts 
A. Risk-adjusted Excess Returns 
Buy-and-hold cumulative returns are valid performance metrics only when the 
sample of firms has the same risk as the benchmark.  To control for possible differences 
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in risk between our sample of thrifts and the SNL Index and control groups, we examine 
alphas from CAPM, three-factor and four-factor models.  We also consider several 
additional factors designed to capture the interest rate exposure of the thrift industry.  To 
capture the direct effect of interest rate exposure, we follow Flannery and James (1984) 
and use the percentage change in yield-relative calculated from yields on 7-year U.S. 
Treasury securities.
19
  We also use the percentage change in the SNL Thrift Index to 
capture the indirect effect of interest rate exposure, as well as any other exposures to 
latent industry-specific factors. In all models, the CRSP value-weighted index is used as a 
proxy for the market return.   
We analyze alphas both for individual thrifts and a portfolio of thrifts.  First, we 
form a portfolio of newly converted thrifts, and calculate the alphas on this portfolio.    A 
thrift remains in the portfolio for three years after conversion, or until it no longer exists, 
whichever is sooner.  Each month, the portfolio return is calculated as the value-weighted 
average of returns on all thrifts in the portfolio.  This produces a monthly time-series of 
returns, which we regress on the specified set of factors.  
Table 5 presents the results for factor model regressions on a portfolio of newly 
converted thrifts.  We report the five-factor model results only for the SNL Index, since 
the factor loadings on the SNL Index are statistically significant while yield relative are 
statistically insignificant in all models.  This is consistent with the results of Schuermann 
and Stiroh (2006, p. 3), who examine numerous factor models and find that “including 
                                                 
19 Flannery and James (1984) fit an AR(3) process to the yield relative time-series and use the resulting 
residuals as a measure of unanticipated changes in interest rates.  They also analyze the actual changes in 
the yield relative, and report similar results for both measures. 
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additional risk factors (relative to the CAPM) typically generates only a modest gain, and 
when there are substantial gains (in R-squared) it is not from adding interest rate factors 
thought to be relevant to bank returns, but instead from adding the familiar Fama-French 
factors, HML and SMB.”  This lack of explanatory power for interest-rate factors 
contrasts with the earlier results of Flannery and James (1984).  One possible explanation 
for the reduced sensitivity of thrift returns to interest rate changes is that banks and thrifts 
today are better able to manage interest rate risk exposure through derivative markets that 
barely existed when Flannery and James (1984) conducted their study. 
The first notable result in Panel (a) is that the estimated market factor loadings are 
less than one in all models. This suggests that the sample of thrifts, as a group, have less 
systematic risk than the average stock. The loadings on SMB and HML are large, but 
consistent with the small average size of converted thrifts (the average IPO in our sample 
raised approximately $54.8 million), as well as the high book-to-market values that result 
from the appraisal process described above.  The addition of the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor bolsters the three-factor model to explain cross-sectional variation in 
momentum-sorted portfolio returns, and is included to ensure that we control for possible 
exposure to a momentum factor; however, the thrifts do not appear to have any 
momentum factor exposure.
20
 The SNL index factor is positive (0.323) and highly 
significant. The fifth-factor loading indicates that the newly converted thrifts have less 
systematic risk than their seasoned counterparts.  This result is consistent with Esty 
                                                 
20 This does not necessarily imply that the converted thrifts do not experience price momentum.  Rather, it 
simply means that the returns on the thrift portfolio are uncorrelated with the returns on a more broadly-
based portfolio of stocks whose selection is based upon extreme recent returns. 
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(1997), who finds that firm risk increases after conversion as managers rationally respond 
to the incentives embedded in the stock form of ownership.  
Also notable are the alphas, which are positive and highly significant for all four 
models (1.3% monthly in CAPM, 0.9% monthly in 3-factor and 4-factor models, and 
0.8% in 5-factor model). These alphas are consistent with the positive long-run BHARS 
relative to the market reported in panel (a) of Table 3.
21
  The alphas are also consistent 
with the superior thrift industry performance over the sample period.  At the same time, 
their large magnitude suggests a possible omitted variable and thus they should be 
interpreted cautiously.   
 Therefore, for comparison purposes we also estimate alphas for both control 
groups, and report the results in Panels (b) and (c). The estimated factor loadings are 
nearly identical to the estimated factor loadings for the sample firms, suggesting that the 
risk characteristics of the control groups closely mirror those of the converting thrifts. 
Second, alpha is positive and highly significant for all models (1.5% monthly in CAPM, 
1.1% monthly in 3-factor and 4-factor models and 1.0% monthly in 5-factor model).  We 
calculate and report the difference in alpha between the sample firms control groups. In 
all cases, the converting thrift alphas are 10 to 20 basis points lower than the control 
group alphas. This suggests that our sample firms underperformed with respect to the 
control groups, though none of the differences is statistically significant.  This may be 
                                                 
21 In panel (b) of Table 3, we reported that long-run BHARS are negative for the subsample of firms that 
survive to the end of the sample period.  Since the regression results in Table 5 include all thrifts, they are 
directly comparable only to the results in panel (a) of Table 3. 
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due to low power, or may indicate that controlling for risk-characteristics explains the 
buy-and-hold return differences.  
To further analyze the risk-adjusted returns, we estimate our factor models 
separately for each firm over the three-year post-IPO to obtain firm-level parameter 
estimates. Table 6, panel (a) reports the cross-sectional averages for the estimated 
monthly parameters.  Once again, alphas are statistically and economically significant, 
across all models. Panel (b) reports the control group alphas and differences for all 
models. Again, converting thrift alphas are lower than control group alphas for all 
models.  Six of the eight differences are significant at the 10% level, and three of the 
eight are significant at the 5% level.  The qualitative results of Tables 5 and 6 indicate 
that even after controlling for risk exposure, the converted thrifts have negative risk-
adjusted long-run returns.  This finding is consistent with investor overreaction in the 
initial days of trading following the IPO.  
To analyze the risk-adjusted sub-period performance, we re-run daily cross-
sectional regressions for converting thrifts and control groups over each post-IPO sub-
period, and report the average daily alphas in Table 7.
22
  We only report the alphas from a 
five-factor model (the results from models with fewer factors are qualitatively similar, 
and slightly stronger).  Converting thrifts‟ average daily alphas range from a low of 2.0 
basis points in the [43, 48] month interval to a high of 8.3 basis points in the [7, 12] 
month interval.  Alpha is positive in all sub-periods and highly significant in all but two 
                                                 
22 Because these sub-periods involve only 6 months, we do not run firm-level regressions with monthly 
returns. 
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sub-periods. In addition, we report the difference between converting thrift and control 
groups‟ alpha for all sub-periods. As with the BHARS analysis, the evidence in Table 7 
suggests that the negative abnormal returns are concentrated in the [13, 30] month period, 
though the noise in the data prevents us from making any strong statements about 
statistical significance.  
 
B. Firm Size and Interpretation of Results 
The existing literature presents evidence that market size may influence returns 
(Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Fama and French (1992)). Thus, we sort our sample of 
converting thrifts into small firms and large firms based on inflation adjusted market-
capitalizations calculated on December 31 of each firm‟s IPO year.  Table 8 reports 
cumulative BHARS for the size-based portfolios, while Table 9 reports sub-period 
BHARS.  Since the underperformance in Table 4 was less pronounced relative to the 
SNL Index than the control groups, we report the size-based results relative to the SNL 
Index.  Results relative to the control groups, omitted for brevity, are qualitatively similar 
and slightly larger in magnitude. 
As shown in Table 8, the underperformance is largely concentrated in the smallest 
half of firms in our sample. The cumulative long-run abnormal returns for the largest 
thrifts are not significantly different from zero. This finding contrasts with Houge and 
Loughran (1999) who found large banks performed significantly worse than small banks.  
One possible explanation is that our sample includes only converted thrifts (which are 
initially underpriced), while in their sample thrifts are included along with banks and 
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bank holding companies, neither of which have underpricing automatically built-in to the 
IPO price. 
 In Table 9, we report buy-and-hold excess returns for 6 month interim periods 
over the post-IPO sample. The small firms‟ sub-periods returns are negative for all but 
one period, but statistically significant only over the [13, 18], [19, 24] and [25, 30] 
(median only) month periods.  Interestingly, the sub-period returns for the largest firms 
are also significantly negative over the same three sub-periods, though these negative 
returns are largely offset by subsequent positive returns.  
Because our sample of converting thrifts consists primarily of smaller firms, the 
results which utilize daily return data may be biased due to nonsynchronous trading. 
However, we also examine performance utilizing monthly data. Comparison between the 
daily and monthly results indicates that the results are largely the same whether daily or 
monthly returns are used.  Since the impact of nonsynchronous trading on monthly 
returns is minimal (Scholes and Williams (1977)), this suggests that nonsynchronous 
trading is not a significant factor in our results.   
Taken together, our results suggest that investor overreaction drives prices above 
fundamental value on the initial day of trading, that this overreaction continues for at 
least six months, then corrects between eighteen and thirty months after the IPO.  These 
price dynamics are most consistent with the empirical predictions of Daniel et al. (1998), 
and are also most pronounced for the smallest firms in our sample.  Our results are also 
broadly consistent with the model of Miller (1977) in which heterogeneous beliefs about 
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stock returns leads to overvaluation in the presence of short-sales constraints.
23
 This 
overvaluation theory predicts that the greater the divergence of opinion, the greater the 
overvaluation and the lower the realized future returns.  It is quite plausible to assume 
short-sales are difficult or expensive, given the small size and high insider ownership of 
the thrifts in our sample.  While the thrift industry is highly regulated and transparent, if 
belief differences are strongest among the small thrifts, then our empirical results are also 
consistent with Miller (1977). 
  
IV. Conclusion 
We study long-run return properties of a unique set of 221 thrifts that converted 
from mutual to stock form between 1993 and 2000.  Our sample of firms is uniquely 
suited for examining investor behavior because we know that the average firm is initially 
underpriced.  Thus, any long-run negative returns unambiguously result from investor 
behavior that drives prices above fundamental value at some point after the IPO.   
We find that after removing the large first-day returns, converting thrifts have 
negative long-run cumulative abnormal returns when measured at horizons of two to five 
years.  This is consistent with investor behavior on the initial day of trading that drives 
prices above fundamental value.  We also examine abnormal returns over various sub-
periods for evidence of investor overreaction at any time after the IPO.  We find that the 
thrift returns are positive for up to six months post-IPO and insignificant in the [7,12] 
                                                 
23 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight. 
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month period, which suggests that prices remain above fundamental value for up to a 
year following the IPO.   
Beginning in year two, abnormal returns are significantly negative, indicating a 
reversion of price to fundamental value.  This reversion is concentrated in the [13, 30] 
month period, after which point abnormal returns are not significantly different from 
zero.  This finding is strongest for the smallest firms in the sample, but is significant for 
the large thrifts as well.  We also measure risk-adjusted abnormal performance by using a 
number of factor models.  While the statistical significance of these results is somewhat 
weaker, they also demonstrate that the long-run abnormal returns are negative, and that 
the poor performance is concentrated in the second and third years following the IPO.   
The documented price patterns are consistent with the empirical predictions of Daniel et 
al. (1998), and are most pronounced for the smallest firms in our sample. 
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Figure 1:  Hypothetical Initial Investor Reaction and Subsequent Price Response to 
an IPO 
 
The graph presents four different scenarios of initial investor reaction and subsequent price response to an 
IPO. Without loss of generality, the issue is assumed to be underpriced by 15%, so the horizontal line at 
15% represents the cumulative excess return associated with convergence of the firm value to fundamental 
value. Scenario 1 displays initial underreaction and subsequent convergence to fundamental value (no 
overreaction).  Scenario 2 presents initial underreaction, followed by subsequent overreaction and eventual 
convergence to fundamental value. Scenario 2 is consistent with Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and 
Hong and Stein (1999). Scenario 3 depicts initial overreaction and subsequent mean-reversion to 
fundamental value. Scenario 4 also displays initial overreaction, followed by subsequent overreaction, and 
eventual convergence to fundamental value. Scenario 4 is consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998). 
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Figure 2:  SNL Thrift Index and Value-Weighted Market Index 
 
Figure plots daily closing values for SNL Thrift Index and CRSP value-weighted market index from 
January 1, 1993 through July 31, 2005, each normalized to a starting value of 100. 
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Table 1:  Yearly Sample Statistics on Converting Thrifts 
Average firm characteristics are reported for each year in the sample.  The initial return is defined as the closing price on the first day of trade, minus the 
offer price, divided by the offer price.  Offer prices are provided by SNL Securities and hand verified in the Wall Street Journal.  Cumulative return for 
days two through five is defined as the closing price on the fifth day of trading, minus the closing price on the first day of trading, divided by the closing 
price on the first day of trading.  Number of conversions, IPO Proceeds and pre-conversion equity data are provided by SNL Securities, and the ratio of 
pre-conversion equity to IPO Proceeds is reported as pre-conversion equity to proceeds ratio. COMPUSTAT data are used to calculate post-conversion 
assets (data6), post-conversion Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio and Price-to-Book (P/B) ratio.  P/E price of equity to earnings, and P/B is market value of 
total assets to book value of total assets.  P/E is calculated as mkt_equity/(data53*data54) and P/B is calculated as [(data181-
data35+prefstk+mkt_equity)/(data6)], where mkt_equity equals (data199*data25), and prefstk equals data10, or data56 if data10 is missing, or data130 
if data56 and data10 are missing.  Post-conversion market capitalization, average daily trading volume and average bid-ask spread are calculated for 
each firm using daily CRSP data for all trading days in the calendar year of conversion.  
 
 
Panel (a): Sample of Converting Thrifts 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
# 
 
First-Day 
Return 
Cum. 
Return 
Days 
2-5 
 
IPO 
Proceed 
(000s) 
 
 
Pre-Conversion 
Equity (000s) 
 
Pre-Con 
Equity to 
Proceeds 
 
 
Bid-Ask 
Spread 
 
 
 
Assets 
1993 22 26.76% 1.42% 73,396 22,312.3 60.16% 0.666 735,222 
1994 46 12.84% -0.02% 66,342 31,759.0 50.98% 0.472 653,518 
1995 51 15.45% 0.51% 28,338 11,364.8 47.51% 0.470 292,201 
1996 48 12.54% 0.44% 34,848 12,702.8 39.12% 0.445 629,204 
1997 19 34.81% 0.75% 81,121 23,636.6 35.77% 0.300 1,414,610 
1998 20 31.33% -0.56% 100,321 18,860.1 27.81% 0.281 877,647 
1999 9 6.85% -2.38% 83,445 48,268.4 54.80% 0.134 702,202 
2000 6 6.41% -1.04% 47,445 38,510.0 74.94% 0.270 692,269 
Mean 221 17.91% 0.24% 54,830 20,963.3 45.06% 0.434 648,405 
Median 221 17.18% 0.00% 23,804 9,242 40.35% 0.362 308,219 
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Table 1:  Yearly Sample Statistics on Converting Thrifts continued 
P/E is calculated as mkt_equity/(data53*data54) and P/B is calculated as [(data181-data35+prefstk+mkt_equity)/(data6)], where mkt_equity equals 
(data199*data25), and prefstk equals data10, or data56 if data10 is missing, or data130 if data56 and data10 are missing.  Post-conversion market 
capitalization, average daily trading volume and average bid-ask spread are calculated for each firm using daily CRSP data for all trading days in the 
calendar year of conversion.  
 
Panel (a): Sample of Converting Thrifts continued 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
# 
 
 
 
P/E Ratio 
 
 
 
P/B Ratio 
 
 
Post-Conversion Market 
Cap 
 
 
 
Avg. Daily Volume 
1993 22 11.8 0.970 66,174.8 83,565.5 
1994 46 16.6 0.957 78,554.5 77,439.3 
1995 51 15.6 0.981 36,345.2 164,885.5 
1996 48 22.8 1.007 43,295.9 46,420.5 
1997 19 22.1 1.061 140,564.4 219,531.0 
1998 20 18.5 0.971 154,847.9 118,477.2 
1999 9 20.6 0.936 99,040.3 229,681.4 
2000 6 12.1 0.964 75,104.6 39,786.6 
Mean 221 18.4 0.973 72,899.7 112,599.5 
Median 221 15.1 0.971 29,645.5 25,987.8 
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Table 2:  Yearly Sample Statistics on SNL Thrift Index and Control Thrifts 
Average firm characteristics are reported for each year in the sample.  Data in panel (a) are provided by 
SNL Securities, and report average summary statistics for seasoned thrifts that comprise the SNL Thrift 
Index.  For each calendar year, we report the average value for each statistic, and also report average and 
median values for the entire sample period.  Panels (b) and (c) report summary statistics for the two control 
groups described in the text. Post-conversion market capitalization, average daily trading volume and 
average bid-ask spread are calculated for each firm using daily CRSP data for all trading days in each 
calendar year.  Assets, P/E ratio and P/B ratio are calculated as described in Table 1. 
 
  
 
Year 
 
 
N 
Post-
Conversion 
Market Cap 
Avg. 
Daily 
Volume 
 
Bid-Ask 
Spread 
 
 
Assets 
 
P/E 
Ratio 
 
P/B 
Ratio 
Panel (a):  SNL Thrift Index      
 1993 504 107,490.1 22,047.0 n/a 1,113,340 11.4 1.16 
 1994 474 105,078.3 29,188.5 n/a 1,225,963 12.0 1.12 
 1995 442 152,836.8 31,050.3 n/a 1,430,204 13.2 1.17 
 1996 421 202,813.3 33,275.4 n/a 1,640,729 14.3 1.32 
 1997 382 311,316.5 42,820.3 n/a 1,726,479 16.9 2.02 
 1998 337 282,548.0 58,721.1 n/a 1,915,591 17.9 2.17 
 1999 309 224,669.1 60,683.0 n/a 2,173,410 15.5 1.85 
 2000 293 357,381.7 57,567.7 n/a 2,549,171 11.3 1.58 
 Avg. 395 218,016.7 39,348.0 n/a 1,721,860 14.1 1.55 
 Median 402 47,110.0 36,191.1 n/a 366,648 12.9 1.35 
         
Panel (b):  Control Group 1      
 1993 22 64,081.4 8,278.9 1.043 774,603 8.95 1.01 
 1994 46 82,383.6 27,269.6 0.859 1,173,580 11.50 0.99 
 1995 51 38,400.4 7,058.3 1.127 429,455 12.77 1.01 
 1996 48 47,342.3 9,838.0 0.712 464,575 28.53 1.03 
 1997 19 133,215.6 14,049.4 0.836 765,773 17.18 1.08 
 1998 20 161,022.6 35,535.1 0.601 1,162,530 -13.63 1.03 
 1999 9 100,665.8 17,383.0 0.248 881,635 13.46 1.01 
 2000 6 91,772.0 14,086.3 0.212 759,772 18.50 0.99 
 Avg. 28 75,287.1 15,779.8 0.840 748,134 14.12 1.02 
 Median 21 33,360.4 3,547.1 0.631 331,852 12.42 1.01 
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 Table 2 continued 
Panel (c):  Control Group 2      
 1993 22 123,082.1 20,097.6 1.112 1,493,120 8.78 1.01 
 1994 46 42,349.8 16,570.1 0.832 691,810 8.02 1.00 
 1995 51 74,433.1 13,032.3 0.707 862,209 10.33 1.01 
 1996 48 81,537.0 11,434.4 0.987 854,255 18.70 1.03 
 1997 19 154.826.1 10,357.8 0.920 766,062 22.88 1.08 
 1998 20 686,327.6 76,283.4 0.604 4,792,020 15.54 1.04 
 1999 9 61,664.6 10,108.1 0.486 644,392 11.56 0.99 
 2000 6 34,650.5 18,178.5 0.483 921,898 12.10 0.96 
 Avg. 28 134,736.7 19,681.9 0.827 1,186,630 13.03 1.02 
 Median 21 40,536.2 3,841.2 0.631 371,364 11.46 1.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
Table 3: Post-IPO Long-Run Returns of Converting Thrifts 
Table reports the average buy-and-hold returns for converted thrifts.  All reported returns exclude the first five trading days after the IPO.  Buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated for each firm at each horizon, and cross-sectional averages are reported.  For each firm, we calculate the cumulative benchmark return with respect to four 
benchmarks over the corresponding post-issue period: the CRSP value-weighed index, the SNL Thrift Index, and two control groups of matched thrifts.  The average 
abnormal return for each firm is calculated by subtracting the cumulative benchmark return from the firm‟s cumulative return.  The cross-sectional average abnormal 
returns are reported in the table.  Panel (a) calculates BHARs for every holding period for all 221 firms in the original sample.  If a firm disappears prior to the end of a 
holding period, its return through the date of disappearance is used.  Panel (b) calculates BHARs for each holding period conditional upon a firm surviving to the end 
of the holding period.  Panel (c) reports the number of firms surviving to the end of each holding period.  T-statistics are in parentheses for means and differences in 
means; for individual medians, parentheses contain p-values from a Sign test for difference from zero; for differences in medians, parentheses contain two-sided p-
values from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians. 
 Panel (a):  All Sample Firms     BHARS (vs. SNL Index)                                             
 
 
 
N 
Holding 
Period 
Thru 
Month 
 
Mean 
IPO 
return 
Mean 
IPO 
BHAR vs. 
mkt index 
 
 
IPO 
mean 
 
 
IPO 
median 
 
 
Control 1 
mean 
 
 
Control 1 
median 
 
 
Control 2 
mean 
 
 
Control 2 
median 
221 6 13.31% 5.28% 1.15% -1.14% -4.07% -3.95% -2.12% -2.71% 
   (4.80) (1.23) (0.224)     
221 12 29.51% 10.14% 1.51% -0.58% -2.45% -6.49% -3.53% -5.62% 
   (5.60) (1.17) (0.419)     
221 18 42.84% 10.87% -5.17% -8.71% -0.54% -4.50% -4.41% -8.86% 
   (4.38) (-2.55) (<0.001)     
221 24 52.00% 6.07% -13.41% -17.14% -1.14% -4.78% -3.51% -6.68% 
   (1.83) (-4.97) (<0.001)     
221 30 61.73% 5.35% -17.38% -18.21% -1.15% -10.74% -2.36% -5.59% 
   (1.28) (-5.33) (<0.001)     
221 36 77.21% 8.94% -16.78% -21.76% -3.47% -10.23% -1.27% -4.59% 
   (1.75) (-4.06) (<0.001)     
221 42 89.46% 11.19% -13.48% -21.53% -2.11% -10.23% 0.98% -4.71% 
   (1.93) (-3.02) (<0.001)     
221 48 96.28% 9.83% -14.09% -22.70% -2.21% -5.87% -1.35% -7.00% 
   (1.44) (-2.79) (<0.001)     
221 54 105.08% 14.61% -13.52% -22.77% -5.61% -6.72% -0.64% -2.57% 
   (1.84) (-2.17) (<0.001)     
221 60 106.38% 13.70% -14.00% -22.77% -4.08% -4.65% 0.59% -2.91% 
   (1.50) (-1.85) (<0.001)     
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Table 3: Panel (a):  All Sample Firms continued 
                                  IPO BHAR minus Control BHAR 
 
 
 
N 
 
Holding 
Period Thru 
Month 
IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
mean 
IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
median 
IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
mean 
IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
median 
221 6 5.22% 2.81% 3.27% 1.57% 
  (2.67) (0.003) (1.93) (0.107) 
221 12 3.96% 5.91% 5.04% 5.04% 
  (1.13) (0.005) (1.81) (0.057) 
221 18 -4.63% -4.21% -0.76% 0.15% 
  (-0.97) (0.354) (-0.21) (0.768) 
221 24 -12.28% -12.36% -9.90% -10.46% 
  (-2.12) (0.016) (-2.27) (0.015) 
221 30 -16.23% -7.47% -15.02% -12.62% 
  (-2.43) (0.001) (-3.00) (<0.001) 
221 36 -13.31% -11.53% -15.51% -17.17% 
  (-1.85) (0.047) (-2.60) (0.001) 
221 42 -11.37% -11.30% -14.46% -16.82% 
  (-1.40) (0.082) (-2.14) (0.005) 
221 48 -11.88% -16.83% -12.74% -15.70% 
  (-1.32) (0.035) (-1.63) (0.019) 
221 54 -7.91% -16.05% -12.88% -20.20% 
  (-0.81) (0.109) (-1.42) (0.016) 
221 60 -9.92% -18.12% -14.59% -19.86% 
  (-0.93) (0.038) (-1.43) (0.006) 
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Table 3: Panel (b):  Firms Surviving To End of Sample Period 
                           BHARS (vs. SNL Index)            
 
 
 
N 
Holding 
Period 
Thru 
Month 
 
Mean 
IPO 
 return 
Mean  
IPO 
BHAR vs. 
mkt index 
 
 
IPO 
mean 
 
 
IPO 
median 
 
 
Control 1 
mean 
 
 
Control 1 
median 
 
 
Control 2 
mean 
 
 
Control 2 
median 
221 6 13.31% 5.28% 1.15% -1.14% -4.01% -3.98% -2.13% -2.82% 
   (4.80) (1.23) (0.226)     
221 12 29.51% 10.14% 1.51% -0.59% -2.81% -7.37% -3.96% -6.25% 
   (5.60) 
(1.17) (0.419)     
219 18 42.50% 10.53% -5.79% -8.77% -2.60% -6.40% -6.72% -11.57% 
   (4.22) (-2.91) (<0.001)     
207 24 49.69% 2.60% -17.87% -20.87% -7.62% -10.94% -8.23% -12.00% 
   (0.76) (-7.06) (<0.001)     
188 30 57.31% -2.15% -25.48% -25.85% -8.22% -14.96% -9.96% -10.23% 
   (-0.47) (-7.93) (<0.001)     
172 36 71.64% -5.95% -29.04% -32.05% -14.81% -27.78% -9.53% -13.33% 
   (-1.03) (-6.79) (<0.001)     
155 42 81.88% -8.38% -28.69% -31.75% -19.93% -25.47% -6.96% -14.09% 
   (-1.21) (-5.92) (0.001)     
135 48 87.32% -16.80% -33.86% -41.06% -22.67% -22.10% -14.22% -24.13% 
   (-1.92) (-5.68) (<0.001)     
120 54 100.41% -14.29% -36.54% -58.75% -35.98% -44.14% -21.35% -33.56% 
   (-1.33) (-3.97) (<0.001)     
108 60 101.35% -26.81% -47.48% -68.72% -36.86% -43.65% -19.79% -27.89% 
   (-1.61) (-3.41) (<0.001)     
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Table 3: Panel (b):  Firms Surviving To End of Sample Period continued 
                                                                        IPO BHAR minus Control BHAR 
 
 
 
N 
 
Holding 
Period Thru 
Month 
IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
mean 
IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
median 
IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
mean 
IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
median 
221 6 5.16% 2.84% 3.28% 1.68% 
  2.62 (0.002) (1.92) (0.107) 
221 12 4.32% 6.78% 5.47% 5.67% 
  -0.63 
(0.005) 
(1.95) (0.024) 
219 18 -3.19% -2.37% 0.93% 2.80% 
  (-1.11) (0.659) (0.28) (0.804) 
207 24 -10.25% -9.93% -9.64% -8.87% 
  (-1.78) (0.085) (-2.28) (0.033) 
188 30 -17.26% -10.89% -15.52% -15.62% 
  (-2.44) (0.025) (-3.00) (0.001) 
172 36 -14.23% -4.27% -19.51% -18.72% 
  (-2.12) (0.131) (-2.90) (0.001) 
155 42 -8.76% -6.28% -21.73% -17.66% 
  (-1.11) (0.278) (-2.67) (0.001) 
135 48 -11.19% -18.96% -19.64% -16.93% 
  (-1.00) (0.094) (-1.82) (0.016) 
120 54 -0.56% 15.39% -15.19% 4.81% 
  (-0.02) (0.501) (-1.07) (0.022) 
108 60 -10.62% -25.07% -24.74% -38.54% 
  (-0.27) (0.025) (-1.39) (<0.001) 
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Table 3: Panel (c):  Number of Firms Surviving To End of Sample Period 
 
 
Survive Thru Month 
Firms in Thrift  
Sample 
Firms in Control  
Group 1 
Firms in Control  
Group 2 
6 221 218 215 
12 221 213 205 
18 219 190 185 
24 207 170 170 
30 188 154 153 
36 172 138 136 
42 155 123 127 
48 135 116 118 
54 120 107 109 
60 108 99 107 
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Table 4:  Post-IPO Sub-Period Returns for Converting Thrifts 
Average buy-and-hold returns for individual six month post-IPO sub-periods for converted thrifts and value weighted CRSP index. Buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated for each firm that survives to the beginning of the stated sub-period, and cross-sectional averages are reported.  For each firm, we also calculate the 
cumulative benchmark return on the CRSP value-weighed index over the corresponding post-issue sub-period, and report the average cumulative return in this 
table.  The average abnormal return is calculated for each firm by subtracting the cumulative index return from the firm‟s cumulative return.  The cross-sectional 
average abnormal return is reported in the table. T-statistics are in parentheses for mean differences and p-values are in parentheses for median differences. 
 
                                                          BHARS (vs. SNL Index)     
 
 
 
N 
Holding 
Period 
Thru 
Month 
 
Mean 
IPO 
return 
Mean  
IPO 
BHAR vs. 
mkt index 
 
 
IPO 
mean 
 
 
IPO 
median 
 
 
Control 1 
mean 
 
 
Control 1 
median 
 
 
Control 2 
mean 
 
 
Control 2 
median 
221 5d-6 13.31% 5.28% 1.15% -1.14% -4.07% -3.95% -2.12% -2.72% 
   (4.80) (1.23) (0.224)     
221 7-12 14.20% 3.95% 0.44% -0.97% 0.70% -1.27% -1.19% -2.63% 
   (3.53) (0.45) (0.346)     
221 13-18 10.44% -0.12% -4.71% -6.53% 2.22% -1.34% 0.46% -2.96% 
   (-0.11) (-4.44) (<0.001)     
219 19-24 6.47% -4.15% -5.39% -6.31% -0.56% -1.24% 1.60% -0.27% 
   (-3.52) (-5.60) (<0.001)     
207 25-30 7.61% 0.30% -2.90% -3.90% 1.47% -0.94% 2.10% 0.97% 
   (0.21) (-2.58) (0.003)     
188 31-36 10.98% 2.74% 0.14% -0.09% -0.25% -0.67% 1.81% 1.66% 
   (1.74) (0.10) (0.827)     
172 37-42 9.82% 3.14% 2.48% 1.30% 1.18% -0.34% 1.62% -0.87% 
   (1.74) (1.79) (0.253)     
155 43-48 4.97% -0.69% -1.75% -0.97% 3.57% 2.43% -1.66% -0.94% 
   (-0.35) (-1.17) (0.335)     
135 49-54 9.77% 7.74% 0.54% -0.47% -1.01% -1.68% 0.20% 0.56% 
   (3.10) (0.31) (1.000)     
120 55-60 2.71% 1.82% -0.50% -0.86% 4.08% 3.40% 0.19% 0.83% 
   (0.75) (-0.33) (0.315)     
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Table 4:  Post-IPO Sub-Period Returns for Converting Thrifts continued 
 
                                           IPO BHAR minus Control BHAR 
 
 
 
N 
 
Holding 
Period Thru 
Month 
IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
mean 
IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
median 
IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
mean 
IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
median 
221 5d-6 5.22% 2.81% 3.27% 1.57% 
  (2.67) (0.003) (1.93) (0.107) 
221 7-12 -0.26% 0.30% 1.63% 1.66% 
  (-0.12) (0.595) (0.86) (0.099) 
221 13-18 -6.93% -5.19% -5.17% -3.57% 
  (-3.39) (<0.001) (-2.75) (0.010) 
219 19-24 -4.83% -5.07% -6.99% -6.04% 
  (-2.49) (0.007) (-3.51) (0.001) 
207 25-30 -4.37% -2.96% -5.00% -4.87% 
  (-1.80) (0.116) (-2.79) (0.003) 
188 31-36 0.39% 0.58% -1.67% -1.75% 
  (0.16) (0.459) (-0.88) (0.334) 
172 37-42 1.31% 1.64% 0.86% 2.17% 
  (0.49) (0.240) (0.42) (0.465) 
155 43-48 -5.32% -3.40% -0.09% -0.02% 
  (-1.82) (0.064) (-0.04) (0.974) 
135 49-54 1.55% 1.22% 0.34% -1.03% 
  (0.43) (0.398) (0.12) (0.961) 
120 55-60 -4.58% -4.25% -0.69% -1.68% 
  (-1.50) (0.155) (-0.27) (0.579) 
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Table 5:  Cumulative Long-Run Alphas for Portfolio of Converting Thrifts 
Table reports estimated parameters from a regression of thrift portfolio return on a set of factors.  Alpha is 
reported as a decimal.  MKT is the market return minus the risk free rate; SMB and HML are Fama-French 
size and book-to-market factors, respectively, UMD is a momentum factor, and SNL is the return on the 
SNL thrift index.  The portfolio contains thrifts that convert over the period 1993-2000, and converted 
thrifts remain in the portfolio for three years, or until the firm ceases to exist, whichever occurs first.  Each 
month, the portfolio return is calculated as the equally weighted average of return on all thrifts in the 
portfolio. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel (a):  Thrift IPO Regressions  
Parameters CAPM 3-Factor 4-factor 5-factor (SNL) 
Alpha 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (4.41) (3.60) (3.31) (3.38) 
MKT 0.282 0.528 0.527 0.207 
 (4.33) (7.51) (7.53) (2.58) 
SMB  0.385 0.387 0.301 
  (5.44) (5.47) (4.76) 
HML  0.559 0.560 0.238 
  (6.30) (6.30) (2.54) 
UMD   0.038 0.034 
   (0.82) (0.83) 
SNL    0.323 
    (6.11) 
2R  13.71% 38.12% 38.48% 53.66% 
 
Panel (b):  Control Group 1 Regressions  
Alpha 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.010 
 (4.57) (3.78) (3.77) (3.75) 
MKT 0.307 0.509 0.502 0.169 
 (4.37) (6.65) (6.40) (1.83) 
SMB  0.386 0.383 0.296 
  (4.82) (4.75) (3.99) 
HML  0.521 0.518 0.185 
  (5.21) (5.17) (1.71) 
UMD   -0.022 -0.028 
   (-0.42) (-0.61) 
SNL    0.343 
    (5.52) 
2R  13.32% 31.90% 32.00% 45.79% 
Alpha Diff -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.56) 
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Table 5 continued 
Panel (c):  Control Group 2 Regressions  
Parameters CAPM 3-Factor 4-factor 5-factor (SNL) 
Alpha 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.010 
 (4.51) (3.56) (3.63) (3.67) 
MKT 0.333 0.582 0.570 0.194 
 (4.63) (7.64) (7.30) (2.19) 
SMB  0.382 0.378 0.279 
  (4.80) (4.70) (3.93) 
HML  0.619 0.615 0.238 
  (6.21) (6.14) (2.29) 
UMD   -0.040 -0.047 
   (-0.76) (-1.05) 
SNL    0.389 
    (6.52) 
2R  14.73% 36.55% 36.85% 53.39% 
Alpha Diff -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.49) (-0.45) 
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Table 6:  Cumulative Long-Run Alphas:  Cross-Sectional Averages 
Table reports cross-sectional average parameters from firm-level regressions of monthly thrift return on a 
set of factors.  Alpha is reported as a decimal. MKT is the market return minus the risk free rate; SMB and 
HML are Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, respectively, UMD is a momentum factor, and 
SNL is the return on the SNL thrift index, minus the risk-free rate.  Parameters are estimated separately for 
each firm over the three-year post-IPO period.  Cross-sectional t-statistics for the mean parameters are 
reported in parentheses.  Panel (b) reports cross sectional average alphas from the same regressions using 
daily returns.  These statistics are reported to facilitate comparison to the daily alphas in table 6. 
 
Panel (a):  Thrift IPO Regressions  
Parameters CAPM 3-Factor 4-factor 5-factor 
Alpha 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (9.38) (6.59) (6.54) (7.11) 
MKT 0.450 0.747 0.755 0.034 
 (16.35) (21.99) (22.24) (0.74) 
SMB  0.409 0.417 0.210 
  (16.47) (18.16) (6.61) 
HML  0.805 0.799 0.158 
  (19.68) (18.16) (3.03) 
UMD   -0.019 0.063 
   (-0.58) (2.10) 
SNL    0.521 
    (14.47) 
     
Average 2R  11.42% 21.64% 24.11% 31.38% 
 
Panel (b):  Control Group Alphas  
Control  CAPM 3-Factor 4-factor 5-factor 
Control 1 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 (8.04) (5.54) (4.04) (4.01) 
Thrift IPO 
minus 
Control 1 
-0.003 
(-1.99) 
-0.003 
(-1.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.71) 
     
Control 2 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (9.64) (6.75) (5.84) (5.89) 
Thrift IPO 
minus 
Control 2 
-0.004 
(-2.75) 
-0.003 
(-2.17) 
-0.003 
(-1.72) 
-0.003 
(-1.68) 
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Table 7:  Post-IPO Sub-Period Daily Alphas:  Cross-Sectional Averages 
Table reports cross-sectional average alphas from firm-level regressions of daily thrift return on a set of 
factors.  Alpha is reported as a decimal.  MKT is the market return minus the risk free rate; SMB and HML 
are Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, respectively, UMD is a momentum factor, and SNL is 
the return on the SNL thrift index, minus the risk-free rate.  Parameters are estimated separately for each 
firm over the specified post-IPO sub-period.  Cross-sectional t-statistics for the mean alpha parameters are 
reported in the last column. 
 
                            Control Group 1        Control Group 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Period (months) 
IPO 
Daily 
Alpha 
(mean) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
IPO  
minus  
Control 1 
(mean) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
IPO  
minus  
Control 2 
(mean) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
5d-6 0.00076 10.22 0.00016 0.92 -0.00002 -0.17 
7-12 0.00083 11.54 -0.00005 -0.23 -0.00006 -0.39 
13-18 0.00049 6.40 -0.00136 -1.78 -0.00007 -0.23 
19-24 0.00041 3.84 -0.00023 -1.41 -0.00098 -1.14 
25-30 0.00052 4.40 -0.00040 -1.56 -0.00019 -1.23 
31-36 0.00070 7.44 0.00000 0.00 0.00025 1.64 
37-42 0.00060 4.82 0.00029 0.69 0.00024 1.55 
43-48 0.00020 1.27 -0.00042 -1.72 0.00017 0.62 
49-54 0.00057 3.96 -0.00008 -0.28 -0.00008 -0.37 
55-60 0.00072 1.79 -0.00020 -0.44 0.00030 1.45 
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Table 8:  Cumulative BHARs for Portfolios Sorted by Size 
Table reports the average buy-and-hold returns for size-based portfolios of converted thrifts relative to the 
SNL Thrift Index.  Firms are sorted based upon inflation adjusted post-IPO market capitalization.  The 
average abnormal return for each firm is calculated by subtracting the cumulative benchmark return from 
the firm‟s cumulative return.  The cross-sectional average abnormal returns are reported in the table.  T-
statistics are in parentheses for means and differences in means; for medians, parentheses contain p-values 
from a Sign test for difference from zero. 
 
            Small Firms          Large Firms 
 
Thru 
Month 
 
 
N 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Mean) 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Median) 
  
 
N 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Mean) 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Median) 
6 110 -0.67% -4.33%  111 2.97% 1.86% 
  (-0.47) (0.001)   (2.51) (0.255) 
12 110 -0.19% -3.44%  111 3.19% 0.40% 
  (-0.10) (0.152)   (1.82) (0.850) 
18 110 -7.90% -10.30%  111 -2.46% -6.47% 
  (-2.72) (0.001)   (-0.87) (0.008) 
24 110 -20.63% -23.91%  111 -6.27% -10.38% 
  (-5.67) (<0.001)   (-1.62) (0.008) 
30 110 -25.20% -24.14%  111 -9.63% -12.68% 
  (-5.67) (<0.001)   (-2.06) (<0.001) 
36 110 -27.67% -27.01%  111 -5.98% -18.84% 
  (-4.79) (<0.001)   (-1.04) (0.013) 
42 110 -29.81% -29.69%  111 2.69% -14.25% 
  (-5.00) (<0.001)   (0.43) (0.087) 
48 110 -31.30% -34.71%  111 2.96% -9.78% 
  (-4.54) (<0.001)   (0.42) (0.129) 
54 110 -30.34% -39.91%  111 3.15% -6.05% 
  (-3.14) (<0.001)   (0.41) (0.343) 
60 110 -30.54% -38.68%  111 2.38% -8.25% 
  (-2.44) (<0.001)   (0.29) (0.569) 
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Table 9:  Sub-period BHARs for Portfolios Sorted by Size 
Table reports the average buy-and-hold returns over six month post-IPO sub-periods for size-based 
portfolios of converted thrifts relative to the SNL Thrift Index.  Firms are sorted based upon inflation 
adjusted post-IPO market capitalization.  Buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each firm that survives to 
the beginning of the stated sub-period, and cross-sectional averages are reported. The average abnormal 
return for each firm is calculated by subtracting the cumulative benchmark return from the firm‟s 
cumulative return.  The cross-sectional average abnormal returns are reported in the table.  T-statistics are 
in parentheses for means and differences in means; for medians, parentheses contain p-values from a Sign 
test for difference from zero. 
 
 
          Small Firms             Large Firms 
 
Sub-
period 
 
 
N 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Mean) 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Median) 
  
 
N 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Mean) 
IPO minus 
SNL Index 
(Median) 
5d-6 110 -0.67% -4.33%  111 2.97% 1.86% 
  (-0.47) (0.001)   (2.51) (0.255) 
7-12 110 0.75% -1.71%  111 0.12% -0.86% 
  (0.49) (0.634)   (0.10) (0.448) 
13-18 110 -5.23% -5.48%  111 -4.20% -7.23% 
  (-3.51) (<0.001)   (-2.77) (<0.001) 
19-24 109 -8.21% -8.04%  110 -2.59% -1.69% 
  (-6.03) (<0.001)   (-1.97) (0.294) 
25-30 101 -1.79% -2.47%  105 -3.97% -5.93% 
  (-1.12) (0.046)   (-2.48) (0.031) 
31-36 90 -0.39% -1.96%  98 0.62% 0.84% 
  (-0.20) (0.461)   (0.33) (0.762) 
37-42 82 -1.84% -1.28%  90 6.40% 3.03% 
  (-0.92) (0.581)   (3.48) (0.026) 
43-48 73 -3.83% -3.51%  82 0.11% -0.10% 
  (-1.52) (0.160)   (0.06) (1.000) 
49-54 68 -0.02% 0.18%  67 1.11% -0.87% 
  (-0.01) (0.904)   (0.47) (0.807) 
55-60 60 -1.25% -0.95%  60 0.25% -0.86% 
  (-0.60) (0.519)   (0.11) (0.519) 
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Introduction 
 Mutual to stock conversions have brought considerable academic attention to the 
thrift industry. While much of this attention focused on built-in under-pricing of thrift 
IPOs and significant first day excess returns, attention has also been directed at whether 
significant cost differences exist between mutual and stock ownership.
24
 One limitation 
of those prior studies was the omission of mutual holding companies (MHCs) from their 
analysis. A MHC limits the amount of stock sold to the public to 49.9 percent while the 
majority ownership is issued to the holding company. Thus, the original thrift depositors 
own the MHC and a majority ownership position in the thrift.  This paper contributes to 
the existing literature by analyzing mutual thrifts that choose MHC versus full-stock 
ownership and MHCs that choose second-stage conversions. This analysis sheds light on 
agency cost differences across ownership structures and has implications for second-stage 
conversions.  The thrift industry provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect that 
ownership structure has on agency cost since the thrift industry consists of homogeneous 
firms operating under distinct ownership structures.   
 Though the first thrift dates back to 1831 the idea of multiple ownership 
structures in the thrift industry is a fairly recent phenomenon. Federal stock thrifts were 
not permitted until 1974 and mutual holding companies (MHCs) were first authorized in 
1987. In fact prior to 1982, the thrift industry was dominated by mutual ownership. The 
following two decades saw an explosion in mutual thrift conversions to stock ownership 
                                                 
24 Cebenoyan, et al (1993, 1998), Mester (1989, 1993), Verbugge and Goldstein (1981), Verbugge and 
Jahera (1981), Blair and Placone (1988) and Sfridis and Daniels (2004) examined the relative cost 
efficiencies of stock and mutual thrifts.  
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with full conversion as the primary method. This changed in 2004 when the preferred 
method of mutual conversion switched to MHCs.  
This paper examines four questions surrounding thrift conversions and the 
growing importance of MHCs.  First, do significant agency cost differences exist with 
respect to ownership structure? Second, do agency costs help explain whether a 
converting mutual company chooses a MHC or full stock ownership?  Third, can agency 
cost help explain the probability that a MHC will choose a second-stage conversions? 
Lastly, do agency costs help explain the probability that a publicly traded thrift will be 
acquired? 
 We examine four areas of agency costs with respect to converting thrifts: 
customer-owner conflict; manager-owner conflict; over-capitalization; and MHCs as 
value enhancing to minority public shareholders. Mayers and Smith (2002) point out that 
the customer-owner conflict does not exist in mutual thrifts.  Customers of a stock thrift 
have fixed claims, and thus the agency costs associated with the customer-owner conflict 
in the thrift industry are similar to those associated with the more common bondholder-
owner conflict. Consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis, Esty (1997) finds that 
mutual-to-stock thrifts engage in riskier lending activities compared to mutual thrifts. The 
existence of the manager-owner conflict in thrifts has been examined with respect to cost 
efficiency of mutual versus stock thrift, though with mixed results (see footnote 1). The 
risk of over-capitalization would appear greater with full conversions since it issue 100 
percent of its shares to the public compared to a MHC which is limited to issuing no 
more than 49.9 percent of its shares to the public. Carow, Cox and Roden (2004) present 
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evidence that MHCs report significantly higher price-to-book on the initial day of trading 
following the IPO compared to Non-MHCs. They attribute the higher price-to-book to 
potential benefits of the MHC ownership structure.  
The current paper contributes to the study of ownership structure by identifying 
significant differences in agency costs in the demutualized thrift industry and significance 
of agency costs in selection of ownership structure and merger and acquisitions. In 
particular, this sheds light on mutual thrifts selecting MHCs versus full conversions and 
MHCs that choose second stage conversions. Our sample includes 209 full conversions, 
62 MHCs and 44 second-stage conversions during the period 1993 through 2005.   
While we expect to find agency costs differences across ownership structures we 
anticipate they generally will be found between MHCs and full conversions. Since full 
and second-stage conversions are 100 percent stock owned thrifts, we anticipate that they 
will behave somewhat similarly. Our empirical evidence reveals several significant 
differences in agency costs variables across ownership structures. Our converting thrifts 
undertake less lending risk than the thrift industry. Full and second-stage conversions 
undertake greater lending risk throughout the post-conversion sample period and greater 
lending risk compared to MHCs. Not surprising, three years post-conversion full 
conversions and second-stage conversions appear similar with respect to lending risk. 
MHCs appear to engage in the less lending risk throughout the post-conversion period. 
Thus, there is some evidence differences exist with respect to lending risk across 
ownership structures. In addition, full conversions report significantly higher interest 
income to average assets compared to MHCs, second-stage conversions and the thrift 
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industry for all three years following the year of conversion. This suggests full 
conversions are more efficient with respect to asset utilization possibly resulting in better 
investment decisions and higher margin investments. However, at the end of the sample 
period, full and second-stage conversions appear similar. MHCs underperform the 
industry for all sample periods possibly the result of investing in low margin assets or 
management shirking with respect to investment decisions. MHCs appear to be costliest 
to operate while full and second-stage conversions demonstrate similar cost behavior. 
This may reflect management‟s control of the MHC possibly resulting in wealth 
expropriation behavior. Full and second-stage conversions report similar ROAA 
throughout the sample periods. However, in the final sample period MHCs outperformed 
full, second-stage conversions and the thrift industry with respect to ROAA. This 
possibly reflects the low margin low risk investment strategy was successful in a period 
of large losses sustained by the thrift industry. In addition, there is little evidence of over-
capitalization with respect to ROAA (which reduces ROAA). All ownership structures 
underperformed the thrift industry with respect to ROAE. This is a reflection of the 
strong capital position of our sample thrifts compared to the thrift industry. Thus, with 
respect to ROAE, all converting thrifts demonstrate signs of over-capitalization. Last, 
MHCs and second-stage conversions report higher price-to-book versus full conversions 
for the entire sample period; though there are no significant differences at the end of the 
sample period.  This possibly suggests that the MHC ownership structure provides 
temporary greater market valuation to minority shareholders, possibly the result of 
potential benefits of the MHC ownership structure (Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004)). This 
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is significant for management since it may indicate the ability generate greater market 
valuation for minority public shareholders by electing a MHC versus full conversion and 
potential value of a two-step process to full conversion.  
We find agency costs are significant in explaining the probability mutual thrifts 
select a MHC over full conversion. In particular, larger mutual thrifts that are inefficient 
with respect to asset utilization or invest in low margin assets are more likely to choose a 
MHC.  
 We also find evidence that agency cost variables are significant in explaining the 
probability MHCs that choose second-stage conversions and publicly traded thrifts that 
are acquired. Consistent with Carow, Cox and Roden (2009) who argue that large 
announcement day returns recorded by MHCs that choose second-stage conversions is 
evidence of minority public shareholders‟ approval of adopting a lower agency cost 
ownership structure, we find agency costs are significant for explaining the probability 
MHCs that select second-stage conversions. For example, MHCs that report lower price-
to-book and are more costly to operate choose second-stage conversions. Thus, while the 
MHC ownership structure may provides benefits that generally result in higher market 
valuation, MHCs that experience declining price-to-book ratio are more likely to choose 
second-state conversions. Since MHCs are effectively controlled by management, this 
may reflect management‟s inability to effectively monitor itself, and minority 
shareholders‟ desire to subject management to the discipline of the market for corporate 
control. It may also represent a value investment opportunity for management and 
existing investors.  In addition, we generally find publicly traded thrifts that report higher 
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price-to-book and greater ROAA are acquired. This may reflect the desire to acquire 
thrifts that will immediately improve the financial position of the acquirer.   
 We form portfolios sorted on total assets to examine similar size mutual thrifts 
that choose MHCs, MHCs that choose second-stage conversion and publicly traded 
thrifts that are acquired. We find large mutual thrifts that are inefficient with respect to 
asset utilization or invest in low margin assets are more likely to choose MHCs. Small 
MHCs with high asset utilization and higher operating costs are more likely to choose 
second-stage conversions. In addition, they also have strong loan growth. This may 
suggest small MHCs incurring higher operating costs possibly the result of strong growth 
are more likely to choose second-stage conversions. Large MHCs that report lower price 
–to-book are more likely to choose second-stage conversions. This may suggest large 
MHCs that choose second-stage conversions may represent a value investment 
opportunity for management and insiders or acknowledgement by management of the 
inability to effectively manage the MHC without effective monitoring. In addition, small 
publicly traded thrifts that are acquired report lower interest income to average assets but 
higher price-to-book while large publicly traded thrifts report both greater interest income 
to average assets and price-to-book. This suggests acquirers of small thrifts are seeking 
greater returns possibly through x-efficiencies while acquirers of large thrifts seek 
immediate improvement to their financial position. 
 We summarize the impact of ownership structure and agency costs in Figure 1. 
While it is clear that the various ownership structures have advantages and disadvantages 
with respect to agency costs no ownership structure can eliminate all agency costs.   
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The fact that only approximately 600 mutual thrifts remain in the United States 
does not diminish the significance of the contribution of this paper.
25
 Since 1995 credit 
unions have had the right to convert to mutual thrifts (Wilcox (2006)). In fact during the 
period 1995 to 2005, 27 credit unions have either converted to mutual thrifts or merged 
with mutual thrifts. Thus, credit unions are one step away from the decision to convert to 
full stock ownership or a MHC. Currently, there are over 10,000 credit unions in the 
United States that can convert to a mutual thrift.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 presents a brief history of 
thrift conversions. Section 2 presents alternative ownership structure for thrifts. Section 3 
analyzes MHCs and second-stage conversions. Section 4 describes agency cost in the 
thrift industry. Section 5 presents data and methodology. Section 6 presents results. 
Section 7 concludes.  
I. History of Thrift Conversions 
 Congress was the catalyst for the surge in mutual-to-stock conversions passing the 
Garn-St Germain Depository Act of 1982 which legalized stock ownership and mutual-
to-stock conversions for federally chartered thrifts (Esty 1997). For approximately the 
next two decades, the primary method of conversion was a standard or full conversion. A 
standard or full conversion authorizes the sale of 100 percent of the thrift‟s stock sold to 
the public.  
Approximately five years after the passage of Garn-St Germain Depository Act, 
Congress added another ownership structure option for thrifts considering stock 
                                                 
25 There were approximately 1,200 mutual thrifts in 1993. 
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conversion. In 1987, Congress authorized thrifts to reorganize as MHCs.
26
 Unlike a 
standard conversion, a controlling interest in the thrift is maintained by the MHC. Thus, 
the original owners (depositors) own the MHC and, indirectly, a controlling interest in 
the thrift.
27
  
When a mutual thrift converts to a MHC it has not eliminated the possibility of 
full demutualization in the future. Congress kept the door open for a MHC to convert 
from partial to full stock ownership. In order for a MHC to fully demutualize, the MHC 
undergoes a second step, a second-stage conversion. Following a subscription rights for 
shares that is similar to those in a standard mutual-to-stock conversion, new shares are 
sold for the appraised value of the MHC majority interest in the subsidiary (Wilcox 
2006). In addition, the original minority shares are cancelled and exchanged for newly 
issued shares at an exchange ratio that does not dilute the original shareholders level of 
ownership (Wilcox 2006). 
The regulatory changes encouraging thrifts to convert from mutual to stock 
ownership proved effective. In the 1980s, thrifts were often forced to convert to stock 
ownership to improve their poor financial condition or face foreclosure. In the 1990s, 
even in the wake of improved financial condition of thrifts, thrift conversions to stock 
ownership soared. This is evident in that stock thrifts currently hold approximately 90% 
of industry assets (Chaddad and Cook 2004).  
                                                 
26 Congress first authorized mutual holding companies in the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. 
27 Since 1995, MHCs utilize a three-tier structure with the middle tier stock holding company that owns 
stock subsidiaries (Smith and Underwood (1997)). 
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 As we moved to 2000 and beyond, thrifts continued to convert to stock 
ownership, although the number of conversions slowed. However, the utilization of the 
standard or full conversion as the preferred method of mutual-to-stock ownership 
changed. The standard conversion was supplanted by MHC as the preferred method. For 
the period 2004 through 2005, there were 42 conversions completed, 34 by MHC. In the 
ten years prior, there were over 400 thrifts that went public, less than 20 percent elected a 
MHC (Kline 2006)).  
The change in preference from full conversion to MHC raises several interesting 
issues. First, the MHC form of ownership structure has been around since 1987 but was 
used far less frequently than the full conversion for over a decade. Second, even though 
the MHC structure has become the preferred method of conversion, many MHCs 
eventually choose to fully demutualize. Thus, in the end, the thrift is 100 percent publicly 
owned.  Yet the factors that have precipitated the move to the MHC form of ownership 
structure are not yet well understood. Third, it is not clear if the MHC corporate structure 
benefits shareholders. Finally, it is uncertain whether shareholders are better off with a 
two-step process to full conversion that typically can involve a waiting period of three to 
four years between the first and second steps versus a full conversion.
28
   
II. Thrifts ownership structures 
 The finance industry including the thrift industry is fairly unique with the 
existence of both customer-owned and stock firms. Rasmussen (1988) observes that the 
co-existence of mutual associations and a capitalist system may appear to be odd; 
                                                 
28 Wilcox 2006, pg. 30 
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however, mutuals have played a significant role in the banking industry in the United 
States. The first thrift, Oxford Provident Building Association, preceded by 
approximately 100 years the creation of the federal mutual charter in 1933. Though 
market forces shaped thrifts during this period, one thing that did not change was the 
concept of mutuality with respect to ownership of the thrift (Smith and Underwood 
(1997));  all subscribers (later to be known as depositors) have a claim to the net worth of 
the thrift, but no one individual can sell or liquidate that interest. In other words, 
depositors are owners but they are not residual claimants to the accumulated earnings of 
the thrifts. In addition, accumulated earnings cannot be distributed to the depositors 
(owners) by dividends or capital distributions.  Mutual thrifts also lack access to capital 
markets. Thus, mutual thrifts fund growth primarily with internally generated funds, 
retained earnings.     
 In stark contrast to a mutual thrift is a stock thrift. Stock thrifts were 
authorized by Congress in 1974; although, certain states permitted stock thrifts in the 
1930s (Smith and Underwood (1997)). Mutual-to-stock ownership through a full 
conversion requires OTS approval and an affirmative majority vote of eligible votes. The 
converting thrift employs the sale-of-stock approach to sell 100 percent of its shares to 
the public. A unique characteristic of a mutual-to-stock conversion utilizing the sale-of-
stock approach is the built-in underpricing in the IPO. In fact, Masulis (1987),Barth, 
Brumbaugh, and Kleidon (1994) and Unal (1997) either imply or explicitly make the 
point that an economically solvent thrift that converts to stock using the sale of stock 
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method is almost certain of excess returns.
29
 Though the sale-of-stock approach gives 
depositors the first opportunity to purchase shares, less than five percent of original 
owners (depositors) exercise their rights to purchase stock. Thus, a sizable transfer of 
wealth occurs to new shareholders, including insiders who purchase 20 percent of all 
conversion shares (Dunham (1985)).  
  Unlike mutual ownership where depositors are both customers and 
owners of the thrift, stock thrifts separate the owner, manager and customer functions 
increasing the likelihood of specialization in activities which can lower operating costs 
(Mayers and Smith (2002)). Also, while mutual ownership does not entitle owners 
(depositors) a claim against prior earnings of the thrift, the shareholders of a stock thrift 
do have a claim to the net worth of the thrift. In addition, whereas a mutual thrift cannot 
pay dividends a stock thrift can.  
 There are ownership restrictions for thrifts that convert from mutual-to-
stock ownership. The FHLBB adopted amendments in 1979 to limit management 
purchases, which had averaged 34% of the total stock sold (Smith and Underwood 
(1997)). Management purchases are limited to 25%-35% (depending on size of the thrift) 
in the aggregate and managers are restricted from selling any shares purchased in the 
                                                 
29A thrift is economically solvent when the value of pre-conversion assets exceeds its liabilities.  
Maksimovic and Unal (1993) make the observation that, unlike the typical IPO, a thrift conversion may 
experience subsequent price appreciation even without informational asymmetries due to the existence of 
pre-conversion market value.  
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initial subscription for a period of one year (Wilcox (2006)).
30
 These amendments also 
limit maximum purchases during the initial subscription to any person to 5% (Smith and 
Underwood (1997)).  In addition, individuals are limited to no more than 10% of stock 
for the first three years following conversion, thus, serving as an anti-takeover provision 
for the converted thrift (Smith and Underwood (1997)).
31
    
 A third ownership structure exists between mutual ownership and a stock 
ownership is a MHC.
32
 A MHC offers the benefits of stock ownership while remaining a 
mutual association. Like mutual-to-stock conversions, MHC reorganizations require OTS 
approval and an affirmative majority vote from eligible votes. Following approval for 
conversion, the first step in the formation of a MHC is the establishment of a private 
MHC. The formation of a private MHC is often referred to as a reorganization since no 
shares of stock have been sold to investors. Thus, a private MHC owns 100 percent of the 
shares of stock of its stock subsidiary.
33
 In addition, the depositors of the subsidiary are 
owners of the MHC and elect its board of directors (Smith and Underwood (1997)). The 
vote approving conversion to a MHC authorizes management to sell a minority interest in 
its subsidiaries. The sale of stock by a MHC, commonly referred to as a first-stage 
                                                 
30 Cole and Mehran (1998) find that after the expiration of this lock-up period, managers of the average 
firm subsequently increased their ownership percentages. 
31 The restriction applies to individuals, companies and people acting jointly. 
32 Wilcox (2006) notes that since 1995, MHCs increasingly use a three-tier structure with a mid-tier holding 
company that owns that owns stock subsidiaries to facilitate stock repurchases and possible adverse tax 
consequences of stock repurchases at the thrift level.  
33 The stock subsidiary is almost always a thrift; however, in one case a commercial bank (Wilcox (2006)).  
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conversion, allows a maximum of 49.9 percent of stock to be issued to public 
shareholders while the remaining majority stock ownership is issued to the MHC.
34
   
First-stage conversions, like standard conversions, require an independent 
appraisal prepared with respect to regulatory guidelines. An independent appraiser, hired 
by management, establishes the market value for the converting thrift immediately 
following conversion by comparing the converting thrift with a sample of similar publicly 
traded thrifts while considering the thrift‟s intended use of the proceeds. Thus, like a full 
conversion, a transfer of wealth can occur to the minority shareholders from the original 
owners (depositors) through first-stage-conversions. However, since MHCs can sell up to 
49.9 percent of the thrift to public shareholders, the transfer of wealth under a first-stage 
conversion is smaller (proportionally) than a full conversion in total dollar terms, but 
similar on a per share basis.
35
 This is consistent with Wilcox (2006) who finds that first-
day returns for full conversions and first-stage conversions have been broadly similar.
36
 
However, Johnston and Madura (2006) present evidence that full conversions have 
significantly higher initial returns than MHCs during the period 1990 through 1998.  
Johnston and Madura (2006) argue that full conversions possess greater uncertainty thus 
greater underpricing compared to MHCs. 
Standard conversions and first-stage conversions both involve similar subscription 
rights processes, in addition to establishing a price for IPO shares that reflects the value 
of the thrift immediately following conversion. Following a first-stage conversion, a 
                                                 
34 Typically, the minority shares of a MHC have restricted voting rights (Carow, Cox, Roden (2004)).  
35 On average, MCHs sell 41 percent of the thrift to the public (Carow, Cox, Roden (2004)), pg. 11. 
36 Wilcox (2006) utilizes the results of Luse and Gorman (2005).  Luse and Gorman (2005) compare first-
day pops for standard conversions with first-day pops for first-stage and second-stage conversions.  
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majority interest in the subsidiary is held by the MHC which is owned by the depositors 
while a minority interest is owned by the public.
37
 Thus, the original depositors own the 
MHC and, indirectly, a majority interest in the thrift. However, depositors (owners) do 
not have a claim to the accumulated earnings of the subsidiary nor can they individually 
sell their shares (Carow, Cox, Roden (2004)). In addition, control of the thrift often rests 
with management and directors.
38
    
 The appeal of a MHC is the flexibility it accords through the benefit of stock 
ownership without the risks. For example, the MHC receives immediate cash infusion 
and access to capital markets without the fear of losing control of the thrift. Since a MHC 
owns the majority of shares of the thrift and voting by directors is non-cumulative, 
takeover of the thrift is unlikely. Finally, a MHC can pay dividends.  
A MHC can convert to full stock ownership through a second-stage conversion. A 
second-stage conversion requires dissolving the MHC. The first step in a second-stage 
conversion is OTS approval and an affirmative vote of over 50 percent of eligible votes 
(Wilcox (2006)). The original minority shares of stock are canceled and exchanged for 
new shares at an exchange ratio that preserves the ownership position of the original 
shareholders. In addition, the new shares are sold on a priority subscription rights basis 
that is similar to a standard mutual-to-stock conversion. This gives a priority in the new 
                                                 
37 Carow, Cox and Roden (2004) argue that the MHC ownership structure is a special case of dual-class 
stock. 
38 Carow, Cox, Roden (2004) argue that without a strong participation from depositors control of the thrift 
rests with management and the board of directors. In addition, OTS regulations permit a mutual 
institution‟s management (including holding companies) to solicit proxies of unlimited duration that go to 
the board of directors or a committee appointed by the board of directors. The use of these proxies coupled 
with management‟s control over meetings of a mutual, weakens the influence of depositors (owners) 
(Smith and Underwood (1997)). 
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shares to current members (depositors), ESOP, other members and borrowers, local 
residents, and external investors that are not local residents (Wilcox (2006)).  
III. MHCs and second-stage conversions 
 A problem facing successful mutual thrifts is a shortage of capital since they rely 
almost exclusively on retained earnings to fund growth and acquisitions. The lack of 
access to capital markets forces mutual thrifts to accumulate retained earnings over long 
periods in order to accumulate large sums of capital. For example, a mutual thrift seeking 
to acquire another thrift or insurance agency has to acquire sufficient retained earnings to 
finance the acquisition. A mutual thrift could undergo a mutual-to-stock conversion to 
obtain access to capital markets. A full conversion would result in a public offering of 
shares that gives the mutual thrift‟s depositors the first right of refusal up to a certain 
limit. However, since many members will choose not to participate, or participate to 
some degree, the ownership composition of the mutual thrift will be forever altered.
39
  
 An alternative short of full conversion available to mutual thrifts is a MHC. Under 
a MHC, the original thrift owners‟ (depositors) rights are converted to ownership rights in 
a non-stock holding company. The original intent behind MHCs was to give converting 
thrifts incremental access to the equities markets (Cohen (2004)). In other words, unlike a 
full conversion where a thrift sells 100 percent of its stock on a given day, a mutual thrift 
converting to a MHC can sell less than 50 percent of its stock on any given day.  The 
ability to raise capital incrementally reduces the likelihood of overcapitalization and 
                                                 
39 Aharony, Falk, and Linn (1996) report average subscription rates of 39% for regular depositors and 5% 
for management. However, Dunham (1985) suggests managers and directors purchase an average of 20% 
of all conversion shares. 
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pressure of generating an acceptable return for the new shareholders. In the late 1980s, 
many full conversions raised too much capital forcing stock thrifts to alter their business 
plans and pursue much riskier ventures, many of which were not successful (Community 
Banker, (March 2004)). In essence, the MHC enables a thrift to become partially public 
and limit the amount of capital raised that is consistent with its operating strategies. Thus, 
a MHC accords the thrift greater flexibility while maintaining its mutual identity. There is 
some evidence that a MHC also benefits the new minority public shareholders of the 
MHC. For example, Carow, Cox and Roden (2004) argue that a MHC allows for the 
transfer of wealth from thrift depositors to new minority shareholders through the 
payment of disparate dividends. A MHC can declare and pay dividends to the minority 
shareholders while the majority shareholders can waive their right to receive the 
dividend. In addition, they show that MHCs are priced higher than non-MHCs with 
disparate dividends a significant component of the valuation.  
 While there appears to be sufficient reasons and evidence supporting the eventual 
gained acceptance of MHCs, it is not clear MHCs are viewed as a viable long-term 
ownership structure. This is evident by the number of MHCs that eventually undergo a 
second-stage conversion to full stock ownership. In some respects it appears that a MHC 
is viewed as a temporary ownership structure towards a two step process to full stock 
ownership. Yet, there is nothing in the OTS regulations stating that a MHC was ever 
intended to be used as an incremental step to full stock ownership. It is even harder to 
understand a MHC‟s conversion to full stock ownership considering the results of Carow, 
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Cox and Roden (2004). In other words, why do minority shareholders sacrifice higher 
market valuation and disparate dividends?  
 The concern that MHCs are not viewed as a long-term alternative to full 
conversions was not ignored by the OTS. In response to the concern that MHCs are not a 
viable long-term ownership structure, the OTS proposed and passed significant 
enhancements to the MHC ownership structure to make it more appealing as a long-term 
alternative to full conversion.
40
 While the new rules address a number of different areas, 
the primary changes that will make MHCs more attractive and appealing relate to the 
following: Dividend waivers; stock benefit plans; stock repurchase; and acquisition and 
expansion flexibility.    
Investors generally look to share price appreciation and dividends for justification 
of their investment. For stock thrifts, it is not uncommon for the greatest share price 
appreciation to come as the result as a takeover premium upon sale of the thrift; however, 
MHCs are not typically viewed as takeover targets.
41
 Thus, the ability of a MHC to pay 
shareholders attractive and sustained dividend is a key part of the MHC ownership 
structure (Luse (April 2003)). A distinct advantage of a MHC is the ability to pay cash 
dividends to its minority shareholders since the MHC can waive its portion of the cash 
dividend. Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004) demonstrate that such dividends, disparate 
dividends, increase the value of minority shares at the expense of MHC owners 
(depositors) who do not own shares.  
                                                 
40 Federal Register, July12, 2000. 
41 Friesen and Swift (2009) present evidence that cumulative long-run returns for all acquired thrifts exceed 
the cumulative long-run returns of thrifts that survive to the end of each holding period.  
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The ability for a MHC to pay dividends only to minority shareholders enables all 
earnings to be diverted to the minority shareholders at the expense of the majority owners 
(depositors) of the MHC. For example, assume that a mutual thrifts converts to a MHC. 
As a result of the conversion, 40 percent of the thrift‟s stock is held by minority public 
shareholders and 60 percent is held the MHC.  Further assume that the thrift subsidiary 
earns $100,000 dollars. If the MHC can pay dividends only to minority shareholders, it 
would be able to pay out $100,000 to its minority shareholders instead of $40,000. In 
other words, $60,000 that would ordinarily be attributed to the MHC would be diverted to 
the public minority shareholders. 
To address this concern, the OTS passed a regulation in 1995 opening the 
possibility of requiring minority shareholders to have their ownership diluted when a 
MHC waives its right to a cash dividend in the event of a second-stage conversion. The 
OTS reversed its ruling in July 2000 by clarifying its ruling that MHCs may waive 
dividends and minority shareholders will not face the possibility of diluted ownership in 
the event of a subsequent conversion to stock form. Reinstatement of the waiver of 
dividends allows a MHC to waive its right to the cash dividend. This enables the MHC to 
avoid corporate taxes on the waived dividend and leaves the capital in the thrift 
subsidiary (Goodwin, Procter & Hoar (2000)). In addition, the OTS believed that the 
concern of minority shareholder dilution was a reason for a number of MHCs to fully 
convert to stock ownership.
42
 However, it is worth noting that while the OTS has required 
                                                 
42 Federal Register, July 12, 2000. 
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some dilution in past transactions they involved excess or special dividends paid by the 
MHC to minority shareholders.
43
 
The means to attract and retain professional management is vital for any 
organization. Denis and McConnell (2003) state the compensation issue of greatest 
importance is the degree to which executive compensation aligns top executives‟ interest 
with those of the shareholders, i.e. the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance. 
Over time this sensitivity has increased and is largely achieved through executive 
ownership of common stock and stock options (Denis and McConnell (2003)). Thus, a 
key element of attracting and retaining management is stock based compensation that ties 
management‟s compensation to the performance of the firm. Mutual thrifts are at a 
competitive disadvantage to their public counterparts since they lack the ability to attract 
and compensate management with stock based compensation. Thus, conversion to a 
MHC or full conversion does allow for employees, management and directors to become 
owners of the thrift and share in stock price appreciation.  
Though MHCs can offer stock option and stock awards to its employees, there 
were limits to the magnitude of its stock programs. In particular, one shortcoming of the 
MHC ownership structure is the amount of stock available for benefit plans is directly 
tied to the amount of stock sold to the public (Luse (2003)). Since MHCs offer less than 
half the shares of a standard conversion, the stock benefits offered by a MHC will always 
be smaller than compared to a fully converted thrift. Thus, fully converted thrifts have the 
ability to offer second and third generation stock benefit plans after their initial stock 
                                                 
43 Federal Register, July 12, 2000. 
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benefit plans are exhausted (Luse (2003)). In addition, after the MHC had awarded all 
stock or options under their initial stock benefit plans, they did not have the ability to 
implement additional stock benefit plans (Luse (2003)). Since MHCs lacked the means to 
implement additional stock benefit plans, this had the effect of forcing MHCs to convert 
to full stock ownership. 
The OTS aware of the limits of MHCs with respect to stock based compensation 
passed new rules to address this deficiency. The new OTS rules allow MHCs to offer 
generous stock benefit plans. Specifically, the new OTS rules enable stock option and 
stock award plans to total up to 25 percent of the outstanding shares held by the minority 
shareholders. In addition, an ESOP or 401(k) plan may purchase up to 10 percent of the 
public shares of the MHC. These new rules enable a MHC the ability to grant as many 
stock options and stock awards a full stock thrift (Luse (2003)). In addition, the new OTS 
rules allow employees, management and directors to own up to 35 percent of the public 
shares through stock benefit plans, without consideration to direct purchases by 
employees, management and directors. Thus, these new rules open up the possibility 
employees, management and directors of accumulating a controlling interest in the MHC 
over time and remain in control even in the event of a second-step conversion to full 
stock ownership. This contrasts with full conversions where employees, management and 
directors have always been able to become significant shareholders they were normally 
prevented from acquiring enough shares to effectively control the converted thrift (Luse 
(April 2003)).  
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Stock repurchases are an effective capital structure tool for well capitalized 
financial institutions, including MHCs and stock thrifts. Stock purchases can be used to 
provide liquidity for lightly traded stocks, supporting stock values in weak markets and a 
way of delivering wealth to shareholders other than dividends. In fact, stock repurchases 
are treated by management as more flexible than dividends (Jaganathan, Stephens, 
Weisbach (2000)). Prior to the new rules, MHCs and stock thrifts were not permitted to 
repurchase stock during the first year following conversion. In addition, during the 
second and third years following conversion, thrifts were limited to purchasing 5% of 
their outstanding shares.  
The new rules eliminate any restrictions during the second and third years 
following and conversion. In addition, thrifts can repurchase outstanding shares during 
the first year following conversion, provided the thrift files a notice with OTS 
demonstrating extraordinary circumstances and the OTS does not object to the planned 
repurchase.  
Acquisitions not only allow firms to grow rapidly and diversify they can also 
generate significant abnormal returns for shareholders of both target and takeover firms 
(Bradley, Desai, Kim (1988)). MHCs have long possessed the ability to acquire both 
mutual and stock associations and stock holding companies. Though cash acquisitions by 
MHCs are fairly common, they have also used stock to acquire other stock institutions; 
however, MHC acquisitions of mutual thrifts have been less common due to uncertainty 
and complexity associated with these acquisitions (Luse, (2003)). In addition, on 
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occasion, a MHC has diversified its holdings.
44
 It is important to note that the new rules 
do not speak to the authority of MHCs to acquire other financial institutions; the OTS 
merely confirmed that MHCs have this authority.  
The MHC offers mutual thrifts greater flexibility while still remaining mutual 
institutions. Greater flexibility is not just access to capital markets but those powers of a 
multiple savings and loan holding company excluding insurance activities and of a bank 
holding company (Smith and Underwood (1997)). These powers of a MHC were 
expanded with the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) and subsequent 
adoption by the OTS. MHCs now obtain many of the benefits of a financial holding 
company permitting MHCs to offer a greater variety of financial services including 
brokerage and insurance in addition to banking. Thus, the passage of GLB enhances the 
appeal of MHC as an alternative to full conversion. 
IV.       Ownership structure and agency costs 
 The above discussion describes three different ownership structures that make up 
the thrift industry. Although there are significant differences amongst the three ownership 
structures, one common characteristic does exist, agency costs. The fact that agency cost 
is not completely eliminated by any one ownership structure does not mean that agency 
cost is independent of ownership structure. In fact, ownership structure can influence 
individual components of agency cost and, possibly, total agency cost. Thus, thrifts may 
have the ability to manage agency cost by its ownership structure.  
                                                 
44 In 2000, Oneida Financial, MHC, used common stock to acquire an insurance agency. 
78 
 
 
 Examining total agency cost in the thrift industry involves analyzing individual 
components of agency cost within the confines of each unique ownership structure. This 
is necessary for a couple of reasons. First, the number of separate groups is not constant 
across ownership structures. Second, incentive and ability to monitor is not constant 
across ownership structures. Last, the ability to distribute accumulated earnings varies 
across ownership structures.  
Within thrifts, three stakeholders play a key role with respect to agency cost: 
Owners, managers, and customers. The interaction of these three groups in different 
ownership structures account for differences in agency cost. Thus, we analyze how the 
different stakeholders respond to the various ownership structures and incentives used to 
help align the interest of the stakeholders. We examine four agency issues within the 
context of the thrift industry: Customer-owner conflict; manager-owner conflict; over-
capitalization; and MHC a value enhancing ownership structure.   
A.  Customer-owner conflict 
  Although thrifts provide a variety of financial services, their primary functions 
are taking deposits and granting loans. Depositors are paid interest on their account 
balances and pay interest in exchange for loans. Thus, depositors are a primary source of 
capital to the thrift. In this light, depositors can be viewed as debtholders.
45
 This enables 
                                                 
45 A stock company is owned by stockholders and depositors are simply customers. In a mutual thrift, 
depositors are the owners but they cannot discipline managers and they are not residual claimants in the 
usual sense (Rasmusen (1988)).  In other words, depositors do not have individual claims to the 
accumulation of net worth in the mutual thrift (Smith and Underwood (1997)). In addition, the courts have 
ruled that depositors do not have a claim to a mutual thrift‟s accumulated in the event of conversion (Smith 
and Underwood (1997)). 
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us to characterize the customer-owner conflict, in the thrift industry, in a manner 
analogous to the traditional stockholder-debtholder conflict.  
 The customer-owner conflict arises when depositors and owners are separate 
groups and their interests diverge. This can lead to managers acting in the interest of 
owners at the expense of customers.  Examples include managers engaging in excess risk 
taking, holding insufficient capital, or changing dividend policy (Wilcox (2006)).  These 
three activities all represent greater risk borne by debtholders compared to equity holders.    
The presence and magnitude of customer-owner conflicts is dependent on 
ownership structure. For example, a stock thrift allows for separation of the owner and 
customer functions raising the likelihood of conflict between them. In fact, Esty (1997) 
argues that mutual-to-stock thrifts invest in riskier assets. In addition, approximately 74% 
of mutual-to- stock conversions pay dividends within the first year (Carow, Cox, Roden 
(2004)).  
Like a stock thrift, a MHC allows for the separation of the owner and customer 
functions allowing for potential customer-owner conflicts. However, stockholders are 
minority owners and control of the thrift rests with management. Thus, the customer-
owner conflict exists, theoretically, to a lesser degree with respect to MHCs compared to 
stock thrifts.   
 In a mutual thrift, customers and owners are not separate groups. Mayers and 
Smith (2002) argue that the major benefit of mutual ownership is the elimination of 
stockholders and potential conflicts between owners and customers. Thus, the customer-
owner conflict does not exist in a mutual thrift.  
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 We will analyze our samples of thrifts for significant differences of the customer-
owner conflict. Excessive risk taking is evidence of the customer-owner conflict. Thus, 
our empirical tests are predicated on measuring the riskiness of the thrift‟s loan portfolio 
since lending is where risk exists for thrifts. To measure the riskiness of the loan portfolio 
for three years following the year of conversion, we will use the following measures of 
credit risk: Net charge-offs to average total loans (NCOs) and non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPLs).
46
 Net charge-offs are the amount of loss on assets charged off to 
general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and 
provided to specific valuation allowances. Non-performing loans are nonaccrual and 
restructured loans. This will provide evidence of increased risk taking following 
conversion and possible persistence.  
B. Manager-owner conflict 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the manager who owns less than 100 
percent of the residual claims will have divergent interests with outside shareholders, 
since the manager bears only a fraction of the cost of non-pecuniary benefits taken. This 
creates an incentive problem trying to align the interest of management and outside 
stockholders.  
 The manager-owner conflict can also result in management utilizing less than 
optimal cost efficiency. Cost efficiency and agency cost in the thrift industry have been 
examined with mixed results. Many studies have focused on the expense preference 
hypothesis which suggests that agency problems are the cause of lower cost efficiency of 
                                                 
46 Paroush and Schreiber (2008), pp. 12. 
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mutual thrifts compared to stock thrifts. For example, Verbugge and Goldstein (1981) 
and Verbugge and Jahera (1981) find evidence supporting the expense preference 
hypothesis while Blair and Placone (1988), Cebenoyan, et.al (1993, 1998) and Mester 
(1993) do not. Mester (1993), utilizing a stochastic frontier approach, presents evidence 
that mutual thrifts are more efficient than stock thrifts. Cebenoyan, et. al (1993), utilizing 
a similar approach, found that ownership structure had no impact on cost efficiency. 
Sfiridis and Daniels (2004), utilizing Bayesian-based Markov chain Monte Carlo 
resampling methods, present evidence that agency costs explain a significant portion of 
the greater efficiency of stock thrifts versus mutual thrifts.  
While the evidence in the existing studies on cost efficiency and agency cost is far 
from conclusive, it is also incomplete since MHCs are omitted from their analysis. The 
growing importance of MHCs requires them to be included in any analysis of agency cost 
in the thrift industry.  
A stock thrift completely separates the ownership and management functions 
raising the likelihood of interest divergence between management and shareholders.  The 
divergence of interest between management and shareholders results from the inability of 
management to fully benefit from their value adding activities. There are many ways to 
control the management-owner incentive problem, none is perfect and the conflict 
persists.
47
  For example, control of mutual-to-stock converted thrifts no longer rests with 
management but with shareholders who can exert greater control compared to either 
mutual thrifts or MHCs. Management is monitored by a shareholder-elected board of 
                                                 
47 Mayer and Smith (2002) list 7 ways to control the management-owner incentive problem.  
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directors that has the authority to hire and fire managers. In addition, since the thrift is 
publicly held, management is also monitored in the capital markets by stock analysts, 
institutional investors, and other large blockholders (Mayers and Smith (2002)). 
However, it is important to recall that ownership restrictions limit the amount of stock 
that a shareholder can own to 10 percent of shares sold for three years following the IPO, 
potentially reducing the effectiveness of monitoring.  
 Mutual thrifts benefit from control of the customer-owner conflict at the expense 
of less control of the owner-manager conflict (Mayer and Smith (2002)). Though 
depositors are owners, there is little evidence indicating that the thrift is actually 
controlled by them. For example, depositors of savings and loans and credit unions rarely 
exercise the right to vote for management while depositors for mutual savings banks lack 
the right to vote (Rasmussen (1988)). In addition, the federal charter can both limit voting 
rights and limit each member to a single vote (OTS (1998)). 
Since a mutual thrift does not allow for transfer of ownership, management of 
mutual thrifts is not subject to monitoring associated with capital markets possibly 
leading to management entrenchment. Also, since deposit insurance limits losses, 
depositors have little incentive to monitor management or firm performance. Transfer of 
ownership takes place in a MHC; however, since outside ownership is limited to 49.9% 
ultimate control rests with management and the board. This can insulate management 
from pressure of outside shareholders which can also lead to management entrenchment. 
Thus, both mutual thrifts and MHCs lack effective monitors possibly leading to 
management entrenchment.  
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 In addition to monitoring, the manager-owner conflict can be controlled by 
compensation packages that tie management‟s compensation to firm stock performance. 
Mutual thrifts lack a stock price and the means to compensate managers based on stock 
price performance. In addition, since depositors (owners) rely on accounting data 
prepared by management, it is uncertain what they know about management‟s past 
performance (Rasmussen (1988)).  In contrast, actively traded stock exists for both 
MHCs and stock thrifts, allowing for compensation packages to include incentive 
provisions, which tie management‟s compensation to firm performance, measured either 
in accounting earnings or stock prices (Mayers and Smith (2002)). There is some 
evidence of improved thrift returns and greater ownership by managers and outside 
shareholder following the expiration of anti-takeover provisions (Cole and Mehran 
(1996)). Thus, it appears that MHCs and stock thrifts are able to more closely align the 
interests of management with the performance of the thrift, potentially reducing the 
magnitude of the manager-owner conflict.  
 We will utilize our samples of thrifts to analyze the owner-manager conflict. 
Stock thrifts, through more effective monitoring and stock-based compensation, appear to 
have the best ability to control the owner-manager conflict. Management shirking and 
less than optimal operational efficiency are evidence of the manager-owner conflict. To 
test for operational inefficiency for three years following the year of conversion, we will 
utilize the following measurements: operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) 
and interest income to average assets (II/AA).
48
 Operating expenses includes salary and 
                                                 
48 Ang, Lin, Cole (2000). 
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benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense. Operating revenues 
include net interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. 
Total interest income includes interest and dividends from balances due, securities and 
loans. 
C. Over-Capitalization   
Thrifts that issue IPOs have the responsibility of investing large sums of capital 
quickly. Thrifts that raise more capital than they can profitably invest can fall victim to 
overcapitalization. Overcapitalization can depress returns on assets and equity or 
exacerbate management consumption of perquisites or empire building. Mutual thrifts 
finance growth primarily from accumulated earnings and are largely immune from 
overcapitalization. 
The magnitude and timing of cash infusion is a distinguishing characteristic 
between MHCs and stock thrifts. A full conversion involves selling 100 percent of the 
stock to the public and immediately investing the new funds in positive NPV projects. 
Thus, one of the concerns with a full conversion is overcapitalization. On the other hand, 
a MHC sells up to 49.9 percent of the stock of its subsidiaries. Thus, the amount of funds 
MHCs has to invest will be significantly smaller, proportionally, compared to a full 
conversion. Accordingly, there is less risk of overcapitalization with a MHC compared to 
a full conversion. In addition, a MHC can raise funds incrementally as long as the MHC 
retains a majority interest in the subsidiary thrift (Smith and Underwood (1997)).      
We will utilize our samples of thrifts to test for over-capitalization. We anticipate 
full conversions to experience greater risk with respect to over-capitalization compared to 
85 
 
 
MHCs. Evidence of overcapitalization would include post-conversion returns on assets 
and equity that are lower than pre-conversion returns on assets and equity. Thus, our 
empirical tests include computing and analyzing for the year prior to conversion and 
three years following the year of conversion both return on assets (ROAA) and return on 
equity (ROAE).
49
 This will provide evidence of overcapitalization and possible 
persistence of overcapitalization.  
D. MHC: Value enhancing Ownership Structure  
Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004) present evidence that MHCs return greater market 
valuation to shareholders compared to non-MHCs. They state while dividend policy may 
account for part of the premium observed by MHCs versus non-MHCs potential other 
benefits of the MHC ownership structure may account for part of the higher price-to-
book.
50
 In other words, there are features unique to MHCs that result in greater market 
valuation to shareholders.  
The first unique feature of a MHC is dividends. While MHCs and stock thrifts 
both have the ability to pay dividends, the dual ownership structure of a MHC 
complicates the payment of dividends. The ownership of a MHC is divided between 
private majority owners (depositors) and public minority shareholders. The public 
minority shareholders can receive dividends but the majority owners can waive receipt of 
the dividend. Carow, Cox, Roden (2004) argue that the MHC structure allows for the 
potential transfer of wealth from the thrift‟s original owners (depositors) to the minority 
                                                 
49 Ang, Lin, Cole (2000). 
50 Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004) find higher price-to-book for MHCs persists prior to the OTS ruling in 
1995 and subsequent to OTS ruling. 
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shareholders through the payment of disparate dividends.
 51
  Approximately 94% of 
MHCs pay dividends within the first year of conversion (Carow, Cox, Roden (2004)).    
A second unique feature of a MHC is an anti-takeover provision. The takeover 
market can substitute for corporate governance mechanisms that are weak or ineffective. 
Fama (1978) identifies takeover as a factor in controlling the cost of management borne 
by the owners. In addition, Jensen (1986, 1988) argues that takeover can discipline 
management when internal control mechanisms fail. In other words, a firm is a takeover 
target if management fails to maximize firm value. There is some evidence that 
shareholders of fully demutualized thrifts that are subsequently acquired experience 
higher average returns than thrifts which fully demutualize and are not acquired (Friesen 
and Swift (2009)). However, Mayers and Smith (1981) state that a takeover control 
mechanism is much weaker in a mutual ownership since the owners would have to 
remove current management through a proxy fight and still not capture the gains. In other 
words, mutual ownership can lead to management entrenchment. The selection of a MHC 
effectively eliminates takeover as a cost control technique.
 52
 Thus, both MHCs and 
mutual ownership serve as anti-takeover devices which can lead to management 
entrenchment and exacerbate agency cost.    
There are also agency costs associated with takeover attempts. There exists a 
body of literature documenting agency costs associated with takeover attempts. In 
                                                 
51 Prior to 1995, when a MHC paid a dividend, the holding company could waive its portion of the 
dividend. This action increases the value of publicly owned shares at the expense of MHC owners who do 
not receive dividends (Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004)). The Office of Thrift Supervision reversed this 
ruling in 2000.  
52 Carow, Cox and Roden (2004) state that during their sample period eight MHCs were acquired only one 
had not completed a second-stage conversion. 
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particular, Harris (1990) argues that it is perfectly rational for target firm shareholders to 
adopt anti-takeover provisions. In essence, the anti-takeover provision enables 
management the ability to bargain for the best possible price. If the MHC is viewed as an 
anti-takeover provision, then the Harris model suggests that it may rationally increase the 
premium paid for MHCs that subsequently fully demutualize and acquired. However, 
since thrifts operate in a heavily regulated environment and a market price already exists 
for the MHC‟s subsidiary, it is hard to fathom that management will be able to negotiate 
a greater premium upon a second-stage conversion.   
A third unique feature of a MHC is a two step approach to full conversion. Thus, 
a mutual thrift may convert to a MHC with full intention to undergo a second-step 
conversion three to five years in the future. This approach enables the thrift to raise a 
more manageable amount of capital that they are able to fully invest and possibly exhaust 
other capital alternatives available to them prior to undergoing a second-stage conversion. 
In addition, the conversion to a partially public institution allows management time to 
become comfortable with running a public company without outside pressure of 
shareholders. Thus, if done properly it is possible that a two step process to full 
conversion may benefit shareholders. In other words, the antitakeover aspect of a MHC 
may result in greater return for shareholders compared to a full conversion.  
We will utilize our sample of thrifts to determine if MHCs return a larger market 
valuation to shareholders. In particular, does a market premium for MHCs persist? 
Market to book ratio is a traditional measures of valuation. We will compute and analyze, 
for three years following the year of conversion market-to-book ratio for full, MHCs, and 
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second-stage conversions.
53
 This will provide evidence of ownership structure and 
potential greater valuation to shareholders.   
V. Data and Methodology 
A. Sample Construction and Summary Statistics 
We utilize samples of thrift institutions that convert from mutual-to-stock 
ownership (full), mutual to MHCs, and MHCs to full stock ownership (second-stage) 
during the period 1993 through 2005. We omit thrifts that converted during the 1980s 
since many were poorly capitalized and regulators encouraged financially impaired thrifts 
to convert to stock ownership (Kroszner and Strahan (1997)). Thus, thrifts conversions in 
our sample are similar with respect to financial position and less pressure to convert to an 
alternative ownership structure.   
The construction of our samples begins with mutual thrifts that performed initial 
public offerings and MHCs that performed second stage conversions from 1993 through 
2005. The initial samples were provided by SNL Securities.
54
 From these lists we 
eliminate all publicly traded firms not traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ and are 
included in the COMPUSTAT data base leaving 209 full conversions, 62 MHC 
conversions and 44 second stage conversions.  
Thrift conversions, conversion sample sizes, and mutual thrifts by years are 
reported in Table 1. In addition, full conversions and MHC conversions as a percentage 
of mutual thrifts are reported in columns 4 and 6, respectively. With respect to full 
                                                 
53Caprio, Laeven, Levine ( 2007). 
54 We thank SNL Securities for the list of firms. In particular, we thank Mac Matthews for all his 
assistance.   
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conversions, the results in columns 4 and 6 support full conversion as the preferred 
method for converting mutual thrifts for the period 1993 through 2003 and the switch to 
MHCs in 2004. Second stage conversions are more evenly dispersed throughout the 
sample period; though they peak in 1998. It is important to note that the evidence does 
support the switch from full conversion to MHCs as the preferred method of thrift 
conversion, thereby reducing the number of full conversions. However, the number of 
full conversions is also affected the fact that the population of mutual thrifts diminished 
by approximately 50 percent from 1993-2005 almost insuring a decrease in the number of 
full conversions.  
The distribution of standard, MHCs and second-stage conversions suggests that 
many factors may influence the timing of thrift conversions. For example, Carow, Cox 
and Roden (2004) state that the surge in MHC conversions in 1994 and subsequent 
decline in 1995 and 1996 provide evidence that the change in the OTS ruling on dividend 
waivers reduced the desirability of the MHC ownership structure. However, their 
argument fails to explain the subsequent increase in MHC conversions beginning in 1998 
and continuing through 1999 since the OTS did not reverse its position until 2000. A 
second possibility is an application of Baker and Wurgler (2002) market timing theory. In 
other words, the distribution of thrift conversions could be the result of attempts to time 
the market. In an attempt to examine thrift conversions and market timing, we graph the 
percentage of full, MHCs, second-stage conversions per year and the annual percentage 
change in the NASDAQ. The results are in Figure 2. It does appear that the percentage of 
conversions by year tracks the annual percentage change in the NASDAQ. Thus, while it 
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is possible that MHC conversions were affected by the OTS rule changes in July 2000, it 
is also conceivable that MHC conversions may be influenced by attempts to time the 
market. A third possibility is that timing of conversions is in response to growth 
opportunities available to the thrift.  
Since the intent of the OTS rule changes in 2000 was to increase the attractiveness 
of MHCs, the occurrence of second-stage conversions does allow us to consider the OTS 
rule changes in 2000 and their impact on second-stage conversions. The peak years for 
second-stage conversions were 1996 through 1998 prior to the inception of the rules to 
make the MHC a viable long-term option. In addition, 2000 through 2002 was a slow 
period for second-stage conversions; although, the period was slow for full and MHC 
conversions too. However, 2003 through 2005 saw resurgence in second-stage 
conversions well after the rule changes of 2000. Thus, the occurrence of second-stage 
conversions presents mixed results on whether OTS enhancements were successful in 
changing MHC to a viable long-term option for converting thrifts. For example, second-
stage conversions peaking prior to rule changes in July 2000 do suggest that the MHC 
was not viewed as a viable long-term ownership structure.  The resurgence in second-
stage conversions in 2003 through 2005 may suggest that the view of MHC was not 
completely altered by the rule changes. In addition, it is possible that management views 
MHC as a two-step process to full conversion and not a viable long-term ownership 
structure.  
Table 2 reports pre-conversion summary statistics for our samples of converting 
thrifts. Mutual thrifts that choose MHC are larger compared to mutual thrifts that choose 
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full conversion. It is interesting to note that the thrift industry reports average tangible 
capital of approximately 7.50 percent for the period 1993 through 2005.
55
 Thus, prior to 
conversion the average thrift in our samples is well capitalized with respect to the thrift 
industry.     
VI. Results 
A. Year of Conversion Statistics 
 Table 3 present initial return and summary firm statistics for the year of 
conversion for full, MHC and second-stage conversions. Full and MHCs experience 
similar first day returns.
56
 Average gross IPO proceeds for full and MHCs are similar in 
magnitude even though MHCs are limited to selling less than 50 percent of its common 
stock. In addition, full conversions have the lowest price to book while MHCs and 
second-stage conversions are similar.
57
 However, the median price to book for full 
conversions is similar to median price to book for MHCs.  
B. Agency Cost Results 
 Tables 4 through 10 report firm ratios, thrift industry adjusted firm ratios and 
differences amongst ownership structures for the year prior to conversion and the first 
three years following the year of conversion. Panel (a) reports firm ratios and Panel (b) 
reports firm ratios less thrift industry ratios. All industry adjusted ratios have the prefix 
IA. Tables 4 and 5 report lending risk utilizing net charge-offs to average total loans 
(NCOs) and non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs). There are a number of 
                                                 
55 Data obtained from OTS website. 
56 Consistent with results of Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004). 
57 These results are consistent with Carow, Cox, and Roden (2004). 
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interesting results. First, it appears that our sample of converting thrifts undertakes less 
lending risk than the seasoned thrift industry. This is consistent with Esty (1997). Second, 
full and second-stage conversion appear to undertake greater lending risk compared to 
MHCs. In addition, by year three post-conversion full conversions and second-stage 
conversions appear fairly similar with respect to lending risk. This is not surprising since 
full and second-stage conversion represent 100 percent stock owned thrifts. Full 
conversions appear to undertake significantly greater lending risk at the end of the sample 
period versus the period prior to conversion. There is some evidence that second-stage 
conversions do engage in greater lending risk at the end of the sample period. The 
evidence regarding MHCs is a scenario of decreased lending risk throughout the sample 
period. In other words, MHCs appear to engage in significantly less lending risk at the 
end of the sample period than the period prior to conversion. In addition, at the end of the 
sample period, MHCs appear to undertake significantly less lending risk compared to 
either full and second-stage conversions. Thus, there is some evidence of significant 
differences in lending risk across ownership structures.    
 Tables 6 and 7 present interest income to average assets (II/AA) and operating 
expenses to operating revenues (OR/OE) for all converting thrifts. For all sample periods, 
full conversions report significantly larger II/AA compared to MHCs and the thrift 
industry. This may suggest full conversions are more efficient with asset utilization 
possibly the result of better investment decisions compared to MHCs. At the end of the 
sample period, full and second-stage conversions are fairly similar with respect to asset 
utilization. MHCs underperform the thrift industry for all sample periods. This may be 
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the result of investing in low margin assets or possibly indicate management shirking 
with respect to investment decisions. All ownership structures outperform the thrift 
industry prior to conversion, incur a reduction immediately following conversion, and 
recover at the end of the sample period.  
With respect to OR/OE, at the end of the sample period, full and second-stage 
conversions are fairly similar. It is interesting that MHCs report the largest OR/OE ratio 
that exceeds the thrift industry for all post-conversion periods.
58
 This possibly reflects 
management effectively controlling the MHC. Thus,  insulated to effective monitoring by 
the minority public shareholders. Though there are no significant differences amongst 
ownership structures, there is some evidence that MHCs are more costly to operate which 
may indicate management may be expropriating wealth through expense-preference 
behavior.  This contrasts with Cole and Eisenbeis (1996) who found that managers did 
not expropriate wealth from owners through expense-preference behavior in the1980s 
thrift crisis. Thus, there is some evidence that the manager-owner conflict exists to a 
greater extent in MHCs.  
 Tables 8 and 9 present return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average 
equity (ROAE) for all converting thrifts. We find a number of interesting results. First, 
full and second-stage conversions report fairly similar results for ROAA throughout the 
sample periods. In addition, all ownership structures generally underperform the thrift 
industry with respect to ROAA prior to and following conversion. The primary exception 
is MHCs in the last sample period which outperformed the thrift industry. This may 
                                                 
58 It does drop considerably by the end of the sample period. 
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reflect MHCs‟ investment strategy of low margin lower risk investments in a period of 
large losses sustained by the thrift industry.
59
 In addition, there is little evidence of over-
capitalization with respect to ROAA. 
 All ownership structures report ROAE that underperform the thrift industry prior 
to and following conversion. In addition, the period immediately following the IPO 
provides evidence of over-capitalization; however, there is a subsequent recovery in the 
final two sample periods.  Underperformance prior to conversion is evidence of the 
strong capital position of our sample thrifts with respect to the thrift industry. The 
subsequent recovery of ROAE demonstrates the time lag from the capital infusion of the 
IPO and deploying the capital into investments. In the last sample period, MHCs report 
significantly larger ROAE than both full and second-stage conversions. Again, the result 
of MHCs deploying a low margin, low risk investment strategy.  
 Table 10 presents price-to-book for all ownership structures. Full conversions 
report lower price-to-book for all sample periods. It is surprising that a significant 
difference exist between full and second-stage conversions in the second sample period. 
In addition, significant differences exist between MHCs and full conversions for the first 
two sample periods. However, there are no significant differences in the final sample 
period. Thus, there is some evidence that MHCs and second-stage conversions return 
greater valuation to shareholders, although it is temporary. This is consistent with Carow, 
Cox and Roden (2004) who report that MHCs have significantly higher price-to-book 
                                                 
59 Approximately one-third of MHC conversions occurred during the period 2004 through 2005 while less 
than 1 percent of full conversions and 9 percent of second-stage conversions occurred during the same 
period. This is significant since the thrift industry experienced -.04%, -1% for ROAA and -.42%, -11.05% 
for ROAE, for 2007 and 2008, respectively.  
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ratios compared to non-MHCs. They also find that the significantly higher price-to-book 
ratios persist prior to and subsequent to the OTS disparate dividend ruling. This suggests 
that the MHC ownership structure may offer other potential benefits.
60
 This finding has 
special significance for management since they ultimately decide what type of ownership 
structure for converting thrifts. The evidence suggests initial greater market valuation for 
converting thrifts that select MHC versus full conversion. In addition, the evidence also 
suggests that shareholders may receive initial greater market valuation for thrifts that 
undergo a two-step approach to full conversion versus a single step.  
C. Logistic Regression results 
 A converting mutual thrift‟s management must ultimately decide either full 
conversion or a MHC. While the decision to convert may indicate a need for capital the 
ownership structure choice may also reflect management‟s preference for investments 
and expenses.
61
 For example, is a mutual thrift that is inefficient with respect asset 
utilization more likely to choose a MHC? Thus, it is possible that we can utilize agency 
costs to explaining the choice of ownership structure for a converting mutual thrift.  
 To test whether agency cost variables are predictors of the initial choice of 
ownership structure, we run a logistic regression where the dependent variable is whether 
a converting mutual thrift selects a MHC. The explanatory variables include measures of 
agency cost reported in Tables 4 through 9 for the year prior to the year of conversion. In 
                                                 
60 In this paper, we do not attempt to identify which potential benefits explain the significant higher price to 
book for MHCs. This does present an interesting research topic. However, a highly significant correlation 
was found between price to book and a dummy variable representing MHC ownership structure. 
61 Carow, Cox and Roden (2009) state that capital constrained thrifts with greater profit opportunities are 
more likely to choose full conversion. 
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addition, log of total assets in thousands is added to account for size. The results are 
reported in Table 11.  
 The results in Table 11 indicate agency costs are significant in explaining the 
probability of a mutual thrift selecting a MHC. In particular, both II/AA and ROAA are 
highly significant. The results also indicate that asset size is a factor in selecting a MHC. 
In addition, the signs of the estimated coefficients suggest that the mutual thrifts that are 
less efficient with respect to asset utilization are more likely to choose a MHC.  
In our sample of MHCs, 35 eventually undergo a second-stage conversion to full 
stock ownership.
62
 Though the reasons for second-stage conversions are largely unknown 
there is some evidence that minority shareholders prefer dissolving the MHC in favor of 
full stock ownership: Carow, Cox and Roden (2009) argue that announcement of second-
stage conversion generates a 12% return which they attribute to a reduction in agency 
costs. If their conjecture is accurate, than it would appear reasonable that agency cost 
variables explain the probability MHCs that choose second-stage conversions.    
 To test whether our agency cost variables are predictors of MHCs that choose 
second-stage conversion, we run a logistic regression where the dependent variable is 
whether a MHC selects a second-stage conversion. The logistic regression includes only 
MHCs. The explanatory variables include all measures of agency cost reported in Tables 
4 through 10, log of total assets in thousands, loan growth and Tier 1 Capital. Total assets 
and loan growth are included to determine if size and growth are predictors of second-
                                                 
62 The average length of time from MHC to second-stage conversion is approximately 3.9 years. 
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stage conversions. Tier 1 Capital is included as an overall measure of health and strength 
of the MHC. The results are reported in Table 12.  
 The results in Table 12 indicate that agency costs are significant in explaining the 
probability of second-stage conversion in both regressions.
 
In particular, negative 
estimated coefficient for price-to-book and positive estimated coefficient for OE/OR 
suggest that lower market valuation  and costlier to operate MHCs are more likely to 
choose second-stage conversions.
 63
 In other words, MHCs that are exhibiting symptoms 
of agency cost are more likely to choose second-stage conversions. Thus, are results are 
consistent with Carow, Cox, and Roden (2009). There is also some evidence that loan 
growth is significant for explaining second-stage conversion. This suggests need for 
additional capital that a second-stage conversion would provide. In addition, the negative 
estimated coefficient for price-to-book suggests that second-stage conversions may 
represent a value investment opportunity for those that will participate in the stock 
offering associated with the second-stage conversion in particular, management and 
insiders of the converting MHC.  
 It was stated previously that the takeover market can substitute for corporate 
governance. If the takeover market is a substitute for corporate governance, it is 
reasonable that agency costs significantly predict publicly traded thrifts that acquired. To 
test whether agency costs are significant predictors for publicly traded thrifts that are 
acquired by merger or acquisition, we run a logistic regression where the dependent 
                                                 
63In both regressions, there is an agency cost variable that is significant but does not have the expected sign 
of increasing agency cost. However, in both cases the estimated coefficient is small. Thus, the contribution 
to the probability of a second-stage conversion is small.    
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variable is whether any publicly traded thrift is acquired. The explanatory variables are 
the same that are used in Table 12. The results are reported in Table 13.  
The results in Table 13 indicate that agency costs are significant in explaining the 
probability of publicly traded thrifts that are acquired. However, the correlation between 
agency costs and acquisition is the opposite of what we found for MHCs that choose 
second-stage conversions. In particular, greater ROAA and higher market valuation are 
significant in explaining the probability of being acquired. In other words, publicly traded 
thrifts that are not exhibiting symptoms of agency costs are more likely to be acquired. 
This may suggest that acquirers are looking for thrifts that can improve their financial 
position immediately.  
 Since evidence exists demonstrating size is a factor in the performance of mutual-
to-stock thrifts, we form subsets of similar size thrifts, based on total assets, to examine 
the probability of choice of ownership structure, second-stage conversions and merged or 
acquired thrifts.
64
  We ran the same the logistic regressions as above. The results for 
choice of ownership structure are reported in Table 14, second-stage conversions are 
reported in Tables 15 and 16 and mergers and acquisitions are reported in Table 17.  
 The results in Table 14 indicate that agency costs are not significant for 
explaining the probability small mutual thrifts that choose MHCs; however, they are 
significant for large mutual thrifts that choose MHCs. Large mutual thrifts that report 
inefficient asset utilization are more likely to choose MHCs.   
                                                 
64 Friesen and Swift (2009) report that large mutual- to- stock thrifts outperformed small mutual-to-stock 
thrifts over a five year period following conversion.  
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The results in Table 15 suggest that agency costs do explain the probability small 
or large MHCs that choose second-stage conversions. For example, small MHCs with 
high asset utilization, strong loan growth and high operating expenses are more likely to 
choose second-stage conversions while efficient large MHCs with low market valuation 
are more likely to choose second-stage conversions.   
The results in Table 16 indicate small publicly traded thrifts that report low asset 
utilization and high market valuations are more likely to be acquired. Large publicly 
traded thrifts that report higher asset utilization and high market valuation are more likely 
to be acquired.   
To control for the thrift industry, we replace ROAA and ROAE with industry 
adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The results are reported in Tables 17 through Table 22. 
The results are similar. 
VII. Conclusion 
 This paper analyzes mutual thrifts that convert to full or partial stock ownership 
and MHCs that choose second-stage conversions. Different ownership structures allow us 
to examine significant agency cost differences across different ownership structures. 
While we find several significant differences of agency cost variables across ownership 
structures, we also find that full conversions and second-stage conversions report similar 
results for a number of agency cost variables. For example, at the end of the sample 
period, full and second-stage conversions appear similar with respect to lending risk. 
However, MHCs appear to engage in a less risky investing strategy compared to full, 
second-stage conversions and the thrift industry. Thus, there is some indication of 
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differences in lending risk across ownership structures. We find that full conversions are 
more efficient with respect to asset utilization possibly the result of better investment 
decisions and higher margin investments. MHCs underperform the thrift industry with 
respect to asset utilization possibly resulting from investments in low margin low risk 
investments. This may also management shirking with respect to investment decisions. 
MHCs are the most costly to operate while full and second-stage conversions are similar 
with respect to costs. This may reflect wealth expropriation behavior by MHCs. Our 
converting thrifts generally underperform the thrift industry with respect to ROAA. The 
exception is the final period where MHCs low risk investment strategy outperformed the 
thrift industry. There is also little evidence of over-capitalization across ownership 
structures. However, we find evidence of over-capitalization with respect to ROAE; an 
indication of strong capital position of our converting thrifts relative to the thrift industry. 
Last, the evidence indicates MHCs and second-stage conversions return temporary 
greater market valuation to shareholders. Thus, potential benefits of MHCs do not appear 
to persist into the future. 
We find that agency costs are significant for explaining both the probability 
mutual thrifts choose MHCs and the probability MHCs that choose second-stage 
conversions. Generally, mutual thrifts that are inefficient with asset utilization choose 
MHC over full conversion. In addition, MHCs exhibiting symptoms of agency costs 
choose second-stage conversions. This may reflect management‟s inability to 
management itself. However, we find publicly traded thrifts that are not symptomatic of 
agency costs are acquired. When we create portfolios sorted on asset size agency costs 
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are significant for explaining ownership structure, second-stage conversions and 
acquisitions. In particular, large mutual thrifts that exhibit poor asset utilization choose 
MHC over full conversion. Small MHCs that exhibit both high asset utilization and 
operating costs are more likely to choose second-stage conversions. In addition, large 
MHCs exhibiting symptoms of agency cost are more likely to choose second-stage 
conversion. Small publicly traded stock thrifts that report inefficient asset utilization but 
higher price-to-book are more likely acquired. However, large public stock thrifts that 
report higher asset utilization efficiency and increasing price-to-book are more likely to 
be acquired.  
The findings in this paper have particular significance for management of mutual 
thrifts and credit unions. In the event of conversion, management ultimately bears 
responsibility of selecting the ownership structure. This decision is made more interesting 
since there is evidence that MHCs and second-stage conversions return higher, though 
temporary, market valuation to shareholders. In other words the selection of ownership 
structure may have a significant effect on the total return to public shareholders.  
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Figure 1: Summary of Agency Costs and Proxies  
 Figure 1 summarizes the potential impact ownership structure has on agency costs for mutual, MHCs and 
stock thrifts. “0” indicates the conflict does not exist in the specific ownership structure, “+” represents the 
degree of the conflict in a specific ownership structure or potential benefit of a specific ownerships 
structure. The following proxies are used to observe agency cost differences with respect to the various 
conflicts. First, we utilize net charge-offs to average total loans (NCOs) and non-performing loans to total 
loans (NPLs) to analyze the customer-owner conflict. Second, operating expenses to operating revenues 
(OE/OR) and interest income to average assets (II/AA) are used to analyze the manager-owner conflict. 
Third, return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE) are utilized to analyze over-
capitalization. Last, price-to-book is utilized to analyze potential benefits of MHC ownership structure.    
 
 
Ownership 
Type 
Customer-
Owner 
Conflict 
 
Manager-Owner 
Conflict 
 
Over-
Capitalization 
 
MHC: Value 
Enhancing 
Mutual 0 +++ 0 0 
MHC + ++ + ++ 
Stock ++ + ++ 0 
Proxies NCOs 
NPLs 
OR/OE 
II/AA 
ROAA 
ROAE 
Price-to-book 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Full Conversions, MHCs and Second-Stage Conversions by Year 
This graph presents the NASDAQ annual percentage change and annual percentage of full conversions, MHCs and second-stage conversions during the 
period 1993 through 2005. 
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Table 1: Full, MHCs and Second-Stage Conversions by Year 
Full, MHCs and second-stage conversions are presented by year. All data provided by SNL Securities. In addition, the population of mutual thrifts is 
reported by year. Mutual thrift data is from the FDIC website. 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Mutual 
Thrifts 
 
 
 
All Full 
Conversions 
All Full 
Conversion 
as a % of 
Mutual 
Thrifts 
 
 
 
All MHC 
Conversions 
All MHC 
Conversions 
as a % of 
Mutual 
Thrifts 
 
 
All Second-
Stage 
Conversions 
 
 
Full 
Conversions 
in Sample 
 
 
MHC 
Conversions 
in Sample 
 
Second-
Stage 
Conversions 
in Sample 
1993 1,177 33 2.80 13 1.10 0 19 6 0 
1994 1,076 70 6.51 18 1.67 2 45 11 0 
1995 979 81 8.27 8 0.82 5 43 4 4 
1996 905 62 6.85 2 0.22 7 37 0 4 
1997 849 34 4.00 4 0.47 7 20 2 4 
1998 779 40 5.13 14 1.80 11 22 8 11 
1999 740 18 2.43 9 1.22 2 7 6 2 
2000 720 8 1.11 4 0.56 3 6 1 3 
2001 698 10 1.43 3 0.43 2 4 2 2 
2002 674 6 0.89 4 0.59 3 4 1 3 
2003 651 6 0.92 2 0.31 6 0 0 4 
2004 625 3 0.48 17 2.72 5 0 10 3 
2005 606 5 0.83 17 2.81 5 2 11 4 
          
Total  376  115  58 209 62 44 
Average  29  9  4 17 5 4 
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Table 2: Pre-Conversion Sample Statistics for Full, MHCs and Second-Stage 
Conversions 
Pre-conversion summary statistics are reported for full conversions, MHCs and second-stage conversions. 
Total assets are the sum of total assets prior to the year of conversion. Total equity is the difference 
between total assets and total liabilities prior to the year of conversion. TE/TA is tangible equity to tangible 
assets.  Firm data provided by SNL Securities. Thrift industry data were obtained from OTS website.  
 Full 
Conversions 
 
MHCs 
Second-
Stage 
Number of firms 209 62 44 
Average total assets (000s) 422,383 751,653 1,172,108 
Average total equity (000s) 
TE/TA (%) 
37,015 
9.760 
79,798 
10.120 
105,828 
10.237 
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Table 3: Annual Summary Statistics on Converting Thrifts in Year of Conversion 
Average firm characteristics are reported for each year in the sample.  The initial return is defined as the closing price on the first day of trade, minus the 
offer price, divided by the offer price.  Offer prices are provided by SNL Securities and hand verified in the Wall Street Journal.  Number of 
conversions, Gross IPO Proceeds, Total Assets, Tangible equity to Tangible assets (TE/TA), Tier 1 Capital is provided by SNL Securities, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP data are used to calculate post-conversion Price-to-Book (P/B) ratio.  P/B is market value of total assets to book value of total 
assets. Post-conversion market capitalization is calculated for each firm using daily CRSP data for all trading days in the calendar year of conversion.  
 
Panel (a): Sample of Full Conversions 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
# 
First-
Day 
Return 
(%) 
Gross 
IPO 
Proceeds 
(000) 
 
 
Total Assets 
(000) 
 
 
TE/TA  
(%) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
(000) 
 
 
Price/Book 
Ratio 
 
Market 
Capitalization 
(000) 
Avg. 209 18.44 55,619 491,518 19.54 28,243 .812 61,919 
Median 209 18.23 51,543 209,457 18.18 69,891 .771 26,285 
 
Panel (b): Sample of MHCs 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
# 
First-
Day 
Return 
(%) 
Gross 
IPO 
Proceeds 
(000) 
 
 
Total Assets 
(000) 
 
 
TE/TA  
(%) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
(000) 
 
 
Price/Book 
Ratio 
 
Market 
Capitalization 
(000) 
Avg. 62 16.95 57,354 854,803 15.39 107,420 1.023 124,806 
Median 62 13.47 49,355 400,046 15.09 49,772 .784 37,109 
 
Panel (c): Sample of Second-Stage Conversions 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
# 
First-
Day 
Return 
(%) 
Gross 
IPO 
Proceeds 
(000) 
 
 
Total Assets 
(000) 
 
 
TE/TA  
(%) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
(000) 
 
 
Price/Book 
Ratio 
 
Market 
Capitalization 
(000) 
Avg. 44 10.88 144,699 1,497,847 16.89 195,373 1.012 321,403 
Median 44 8.00 68,800 492,303 15.87 59,658 .967 80,549 
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Table 4: Post-Conversion Net Charge-offs to Average Total loans for Converting Thrifts 
Table 4 reports percentage of net charge-offs to average total loans (NCOs) for all converting thrifts. All reported percentages omit the year of 
conversion. Thus, conversion – 1, conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and conversion + 3 represent the year prior to conversion and first, second, and third 
years following the year of conversion. Also, (– 1 minus + 3) reports Conversion – 1 minus Conversion + 3. Panel (a) reports firm ratios (NCOs) and 
Panel (b) reports firm ratios less thrift industry ratios (IANCOs). Net charge-offs are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation 
allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances (per OTS 2008 Fact Book). Net charge-
offs to average total loans for all converting thrifts were provided by SNL Securities. Industry averages were obtained the Office of Thrift Supervision 
website. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
 
Panel (a): Net Charge-offs to Average Total loans for Converting Thrifts 
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
NCOs 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
NCOs 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
NCOs 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 .160 .158 .103 .002 .057 .055 
       (.999) (.597) (.716) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 .094 .066 .073 .028 .021 -.007 
       (.699) (.859) (.988) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 .089 .145 .109 -.056 -.020 .036 
       (.180) (.843) (.669) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 .088 .093 .086 -.005 .002 .007 
       (.985) (.998) (.985) 
-1 minus +3    .072** .065* .017    
    (.036) (.086) (.777)    
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Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Net Charge-offs to Average Total loans for Converting Thrifts 
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IANCOs 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
IANCOs 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IANCOs 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 -.422 -.358 -.283 -.064 -.139 -.075 
       (.543) (.103) (.628) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 -.295 -.302 -.241 -.007 -.054 -.061 
       (.980) (.449) (.480) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 -.251 -.321 -.269 .07 .018 -.052 
       (.162) (.909) (.569) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 -.241 -.629 -.407 .388*** .166 -.222* 
       (.001) (.108) (.066) 
-1 minus +3    -.181** .271*** .124    
    (.001) (.005) (.295)    
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Table 5: Post-Conversion Non-performing Loans to Total Loans for Converting Thrifts 
Percentage of non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) for each individual year for three years following the year of conversion for converted thrifts. 
Thus, conversion–1, conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and conversion + 3 represent the year prior to conversion and first, second, and third years 
following the year of conversion. Also, (– 1 minus + 3) reports Conversion – 1 minus Conversion + 3. Panel (a) reports firm ratios (NPLs) and Panel (b) 
reports firm ratios less thrift industry ratios (IANPLs). Non-performing loans are nonaccrual and restructured loans. Nonperforming loans are a 
percentage of total loans were provided by SNL Securities. Industry averages were computed with data from the FDIC website. The p-values are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.  
              
Panel (a): Non-performing Loans to Total Loans for Converting Thrifts 
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
NPLs 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
NPLs 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
NPLs 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 1.18 .817 .629 .363 .551* .188 
       (.194) (.052) (.783) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 .749 .615 .394 .134 .355** .221 
       (.549) (.043) (.418) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 .625 .597 .577 .028 .048 .020 
       (.973) (.937) (.992) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 .630 .470 .682 .160 -.052 -.212 
       (.414) (.929) (.434) 
-1 minus +3    .550*** .347** -.053    
    (.001) (.016) (.829)    
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Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Non-performing Loans to Total Loans for Converting Thrifts 
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IANPLs 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
IANPLs 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IANPLs 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 -1.36 -1.100 -1.000 -.260 -.36 -.100 
       (.477) (.330) (.942) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 -1.044 -.832 -.808 -.212 -.236 .024 
       (.245) (.266) (.990) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 -.961 -1.010 -.663 .049 -.298 -.347 
       (.925) (.104) (.121) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 -.758 -1.541 -.648 .783*** -.110 -
.893*** 
       (.001) (.786) (.001) 
-1 minus +3    -.602*** .441* -.352*    
    (.001) (.056) (.081)    
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Table 6: Post-Conversion Interest Income to Average Assets of Converting Thrifts 
Table 6 reports percentage of total interest income to average total assets (II/AA) for all converting thrifts for three years following the year of 
conversion. Thus, conversion–1, conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and conversion + 3 represent the year prior to conversion and first, second, and third 
years following the year of conversion. Also, (– 1 minus + 3) reports Conversion – 1 minus Conversion + 3. Panel (a) reports firm (II/AA) and Panel (b) 
reports firm ratios less thrift industry ratios (IAII/AA). Total interest income includes interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans. All 
converting thrift data were provided by SNL Securities. Industry averages were obtained from OTS website. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.  
 
Panel (a): Interest Income to Average Assets of Converting Thrifts             
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
II/AA 
(%) 
  
Mean 
MHC 
II/AA 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
II/AA 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 7.251 6.505 6.787 .746*** .464*** -.282 
       (.001) (.003) (.220) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 7.145 6.345 6.410 .800*** .735*** -.065 
       (.001) (.001) (.906) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 7.150 6.423 6.377 .727*** .773*** .046 
       (.001) (.001) .962 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 7.140 6.329 6.349 .811*** .791*** -.020 
       (.001) (.001) (.994) 
-1 minus +3    .110** .176 .438**    
    (.043) (.427) (.030)    
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Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Interest Income to Average Assets of Converting Thrifts             
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IAII/AA 
(%) 
  
Mean 
MHC 
IAII/AA 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IAII/AA 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 .320 .268 .168 .052 .152 .100 
       (.824) (.273) (.671) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 .150 -.204 .083 .354*** .067 -
.287*** 
       (.001) (.682) (.009) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 .174 -.232 -.040 .406** .214** -.192 
       (.001) (.031) (.144) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 .267 -.044 .122 .311*** .145 -.165 
       (.001) (.301) (.343) 
-1 minus +3    .053 .312*** .046    
    (.413) (.006) (.463)    
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Table 7: Post-Conversion Operating Expenses to Operating Revenues of Converting Thrifts 
Table 7 reports percentage of operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) for all converting thrifts for three years following the year of 
conversion. Thus, conversion – 1, conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and conversion +3 represent the year prior to conversion and first, second, and third 
years following the year of conversion. Also, (– 1 minus + 3) reports Conversion – 1 minus Conversion + 3. Panel (a) reports firm ratios (OE/OR) and 
Panel (b) reports firm ratios less thrift industry ratios (IAOR/OE). Operating expenses includes salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other 
noninterest expense. Operating revenues include net interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. SNL Securities provided 
operating expenses to operating revenues for all converting thrifts. Any missing data were computed from converting thrifts 10-K or COMPUSTAT. 
The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
 
Panel (a): Operating Expenses to Operating Revenues of Converting Thrifts        
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
OE/OR 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
OE/OR 
 (%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
OE/OR 
 (%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 63.210 62.157 61.349 1.053 1.861 .808 
       (.937) (.848) (.979) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 65.848 67.591 63.160 -1.743 2.688 4.431 
       (.720) (.553) (.321) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 63.000 68.389 63.000 -5.389 .000 5.389 
       (.138) (.940) (.209) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 63.550 65.482 63.841 -1.932 -.291 1.641 
       (.719) .994 (.880) 
-1 minus +3    -.290 -3.325 -2.492    
    (.779) (.304) (.396)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Operating Expenses to Operating Revenues of Converting Thrifts       
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IAOE/OR 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
IAOE/OR 
 (%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IAOE/OR 
 (%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 -.902 -1.975 -2.002 1.073 1.100 .027 
       (.936) (.945) (1.000) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 2.499 4.265 .892 1.766 1.607 3.373 
       (.714) (.809) (.517) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 .736 4.057 -.225 -.3.321 .961 4.282 
       (.347) (.931) (.379) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 .199 .652 -.335 -.453 .534 .987 
       (.982) (.981) (.955) 
-1 minus +3    -1.101 2.627 -1.667    
    (.521) (.412) (.566)    
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Table 8: Post-Conversion Return on Average Assets of Converting Thrifts 
Table 8 reports return on average assets (ROAA) for all converting thrifts for three years following the year of conversion. Thus, conversion – 1, 
conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and conversion + 3 represent the year prior to conversion and first, second, and third years following the year of 
conversion. Also, (– 1 minus + 3) reports Conversion – 1 minus Conversion + 3. Panel (a) reports firm ratios (IAROAA) and Panel (b) reports firm 
ratios less thrift industry ratios (IAROAA). Return on average assets is annualized net income divided by average total assets.  SNL Securities provided 
ROAA firm data. Industry average was obtained from the OTS website. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, 
.05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
 
Panel (a): Return on Average Assets of Converting Thrifts             
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
ROAA 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
ROAA 
 (%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
ROAA 
 (%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 .684 .794 .809 -.110 -.125 -.015 
       (.501) (.494) (.993) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 .867 .765 .890 .102 -.023 -.125 
       (.200) (.943) (.276) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 .833 .612 .732 .221*** .101 -.120 
       (.002) (.345) (.359) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 .811 .641 .754 .170** .057 -.113 
       (.035) (.741) (.446) 
-1 minus +3    -.127** .153 .055    
    (.047) (.111) (.523)    
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Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Return on Average Assets of Converting Thrifts             
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IAROAA 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
IAROAA 
 (%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IAROAA 
 (%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 -.039 -.128 -.110 .089 .071 .018 
       (.666) (.815) (.991) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 .003 -.154 -.120 .157** .122 -.034 
       (.047) (.237) (.923) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 -.077 -.101 -.162 .024 .085 .061 
       (.941)*** (.527) (.793)** 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 -.142 .192 -.111 -.334*** -.031 -.081* 
       (.001) (.942) (.019) 
-1 minus +3    .103 -.320*** .001    
    (.107) (.009) (.890)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
Table 9: Post-Conversion Return on Average Equity of Converting Thrifts 
Table 9 reports return on average equity (ROAE) for three years following the year of conversion for all converting thrifts. Thus, conversion – 1, 
conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and conversion + 3 represent the year prior to conversion and first, second, and third years following the year of 
conversion. Also, (– 1 minus + 3) reports Conversion – 1 minus Conversion + 3. Panel (a) reports firm ratios (ROAE) and Panel (b) reports firm ratios 
less thrift industry ratios (IAROAE). Return on average equity is annualized net income divided by average total equity. All thrift data was provided by 
SNL Securities. Industry averages were obtained from the OTS website. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or 
.01 level for two-tailed tests.   
 
Panel (a): Return on Average Equity of Converting Thrifts             
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
ROAE  
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
ROAE 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
ROAE 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 7.167 8.429 7.700 -1.262 -.533 .729 
       (.701) (.951) (.936) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 4.918 5.338 5.919 -.420 -1.001* -.581 
       (.567) (.090) (.559) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 5.830 4.438 5.601 1.392** .229 -1.163 
       (.015) (.911) (.191) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 6.670 5.107 6.430 1.563** .240 -1.323 
       (.026) (.934) (.238) 
-1 minus +3    .497 3.322*** 1.27    
    (.589) (.001) (.146)    
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Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Return on Average Equity of Converting Thrifts             
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IAROAE  
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
IAROAE 
(%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IAROAE 
(%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion - 1 209 62 44 -2.197 -2.595 -3.385 .398 1.188 .790 
       (.967) (.790) (.929) 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 -5.764 -5.501 -5.990 -.263 .226 .489 
       (.831) (.940) (.758) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 -5.324 -4.128 -4.975 -1.196 -.349 .847 
       (.128) (.868) (.563) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 -4.871 -.401 -3.726 -4.470*** -1.145 3.325** 
       (.001) (.478) (.015) 
-1 minus +3    2.674*** -2.194 .341    
    (.008) (.106) (.713)    
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Table 10: Post-Conversion Price to Book of Converting Thrifts 
Table 10 reports price to book ratio for three years following the year of conversion for all converting thrifts. Thus, conversion + 1, conversion + 2, and 
conversion + 3  represent the first, second, and third years following the year of conversion Panel (a) reports firm ratios (Price/Book) and Panel (b) 
reports firm ratios less thrift industry ratios (IAPrice/Book).Price to book ratio is total market capitalization divided by total book value. The industry 
ratios were compiled from COMPUSTAT. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
 
Panel (a): Price- to- Book of Converting Thrifts              
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
Price/Book 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
Price/Book 
 (%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
Price/Book 
 (%) 
 
 
Full 
minus 
MHC 
 
Full 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
minus 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 .918 1.075 1.106 -.157* -.188* -.031 
       (.094) (.075) (.950) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 .942 1.137 1.135 -.195** -.193* .002 
       (.029) (.062) (1.000) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 1.041 1.272 1.174 -.231** -.133 .098 
       (.039) (.425) (.727) 
 
Panel (b): Industry Adjusted Price- to- Book of Converting Thrifts              
 
 
 
Post-Conversion 
Period 
 
 
 
Full 
(N) 
 
 
 
MHC 
(N) 
 
 
Second- 
Stage 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Full 
IAPrice/Book 
(%) 
 
Mean 
MHC 
IAPrice/Book 
 (%) 
Mean 
Second- 
Stage 
IAPrice/Book 
 (%) 
 
 
Full 
less 
MHC 
 
Full 
less 
Second- 
Stage 
 
MHC 
less 
Second- 
Stage 
Conversion + 1 209 62 44 -.514 -.313 -.372 -.201** -.142 .059 
       (.016) (.197) (.828) 
Conversion + 2 194 54 41 -.587 -.410 -.348 -.177* -.239** -.062 
       (.054) (.014) (.815) 
Conversion + 3 168 45 33 -.398 -.349 -.281 -.049 -.117 -.068 
       (.659) (.346) (.862) 
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Table 11: Logit Estimates of Mutual Thrifts that Choose MHC over Full Conversion 
Logit estimates of mutual thrifts that choose MHCs over full conversion. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the mutual thrift chooses MHC and 0 if it chooses full conversion. The year end balances for 
the explanatory variables are prior to the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of 
loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and 
provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of 
nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets (I I/AA) is 
calculated as total interest income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided 
average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating 
expenses including salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by 
operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. Return 
on average assets (ROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end. Return 
on average equity (ROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end. Total 
Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. The p-values are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
                  
Intercept  3.926*** 
  (.001) 
NCOs  .937 
  (.333) 
NPLs  .509 
  (.475) 
I I/AA  -.894*** 
  (.001) 
OE/OR  .391 
  (.582) 
ROAA  1.010*** 
  (.010) 
ROAE  .044 
  (.835) 
Total Assets  3.184* 
  (.074) 
Observations  315 
Likelihood ratio  30.651 
P-value  .001 
𝑅2   15.8% 
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Table 12: Logit Estimates of MHCs Decision to Undergo Second-Stage Conversion 
Logit estimates of MHCs decision to choose a second-stage conversion. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the MHC chooses to undergo a second-stage conversion and 0 if it chooses to remain a MHC. 
Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances 
plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at 
year end. Interest income to average assets (I I/AA) is calculated as total interest income including interest and 
dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to 
operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary and benefits expense, office 
occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, 
trading income and other noninterest income. Return on average assets (ROAA) is calculated as annualized net 
income divided by average total assets at year end. Return on average equity (ROAE) is calculated as annualized net 
income divided by average total equity at year end. Total Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in 
thousands at year end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization divided by total book value.  Tier 
1 Capital at year end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the thrift‟s loan portfolio. The p-values 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.            
                   
Intercept .476 
 (.386) 
NCOs .156 
 (.692) 
NPLs 2.746* 
 (.098) 
I I/AA 2.517 
 (.113) 
OE/OR 3.489* 
 (.062) 
ROAA .770 
 (.380) 
ROAE .177*** 
 (.005) 
Price/Book -1.457*** 
 (.001) 
Total Assets 2.576 
 (.108) 
Tier 1Capital .103 
 (.749) 
LGR 3.526* 
 (.060) 
Observations 161 
Likelihood ratio 50.838 
P-value .001 
𝑅2 36.4% 
  
126 
 
 
Table 13: Logit Estimates of Publicly Traded Thrifts Acquired 
Logit estimates of publicly traded thrifts that are acquired. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the publicly traded thrift is acquired and 0 if it is not. The balances for all explanatory are three years following 
the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general 
valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation 
allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and restructured 
loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets (I I/AA) is calculated as total interest 
income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets at year 
end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary and 
benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net 
interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. Return on average assets (ROAA) is 
calculated as annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end. Return on average equity (ROAE) is 
calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end. Total Assets is calculated as the log 
of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization 
divided by total book value.  Tier 1 Capital at year end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the 
thrift‟s loan portfolio. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-
tailed tests.   
 
Intercept -2.482*** 
 (.001) 
NCOs 1.058 
 (.304) 
NPLs .101 
 (.751) 
I I/AA 1.711 
 (.191) 
OE/OR .961 
 (.327) 
ROAA 2.799* 
 (.094) 
ROAE .468 
 (.494) 
Price/Book .827*** 
 (.001) 
Total Assets 1.501 
 (.221) 
Tier 1Capital 1.781 
 (.182) 
LGR .529 
 (.467) 
Observations 850 
Likelihood ratio 26.673 
P-value .001 
𝑅2 5.2% 
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Table 14: Logit Estimates of Mutual Thrifts that Choose MHC over Full Conversion for 
Portfolios Sorted on Total Assets 
Logit estimates of mutual thrifts that choose MHCs over full conversion. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the mutual thrift chooses MHC and 0 if it chooses full conversion. The year end balances for 
the explanatory variables are prior to the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of 
loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and 
provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of 
nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets (I I/AA) is 
calculated as total interest income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided 
average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating 
expenses including salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by 
operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. Return 
on average assets (ROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end. Return 
on average equity (ROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end. Total 
Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. The p-values are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.                          
                                                            
                                                Small Mutual Thrifts       Large Mutual Thrifts 
Intercept -1.868*** 4.899*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
NCOs 2.431 1.081 
 (.119) (.299) 
NPLs .040 2.705* 
 (.842) (.100) 
I I/AA .051 -.910*** 
 (.821) (.001) 
OE/OR .006 1.739 
 (.941) (.187) 
ROAA 1.753 2.118 
 (.186) (.146) 
ROAE .914 1.147 
 (.339) (.284) 
Observations 155 160 
Likelihood ratio NA 22.559 
P-value NA .001 
𝑅2 0% 20.3% 
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Table 15: Logit Estimates of MHCs Decision to Undergo Second-Stage Conversion for 
Portfolios Sorted on Total Assets 
Logit estimates of MHCs decision to choose a second-stage conversion. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the MHC chooses to undergo a second-stage conversion and 0 if it chooses to remain a MHC. 
The balances for all explanatory variables are three years following the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total 
loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss 
on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans 
(NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest 
income to average assets (II/AA) is calculated as total interest income including interest and dividends from 
balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues 
(OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other 
noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, trading income and 
other noninterest income. Return on average assets (ROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by 
average total assets at year end. Return on average equity (ROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by 
average total equity at year end. Total Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year 
end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization divided by total book value.  Tier 1 Capital at year 
end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the thrift‟s loan portfolio. The p-values are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.                          
                                                           Small MHCs                        Large MHCs 
Intercept -21.883*** 4.308*** 
 (.000) (.001) 
NCOs 1.519 .011 
 (.218) (.916) 
NPLs .052 .006 
 (.820) (.939) 
I I/AA 1.885*** 2.140 
 (.001) (.140) 
OE/OR .081*** .356 
 (.010) (.550) 
ROAA 3.668* 2.632** 
 (.055) (.023) 
ROAE .395** 1.027 
 (.030) (.311) 
Price/Book .303 -4.185** 
 (.582) (.001) 
Tier 1Capital 3.47 .001* 
 (.556) (.053) 
LGR .081** .40 
 (.010) (.527) 
Observations 82 79 
Likelihood ratio 41.218 72.034 
P-value .001 .001 
𝑅2 53.8% 80.5% 
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Table 16: Logit Estimates of Publicly Traded Thrifts Acquired for Portfolios Sorted on 
Total Assets 
Logit estimates of publicly traded thrifts that are acquired. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the publicly traded thrift is acquired and 0 if it is not.. The balances for all explanatory variables are three years 
following the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off 
to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific 
valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and 
restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets (II/AA) is calculated as total 
interest income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets 
at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary 
and benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net 
interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. Return on average assets (ROAA) is 
calculated as annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end. Return on average equity (ROAE) is 
calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end. Total Assets is calculated as the log 
of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization 
divided by total book value.  Tier 1 Capital at year end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the 
thrift‟s loan portfolio. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-
tailed tests.                           
                                                            Small Thrifts                        Large Thrifts 
Intercept 1.948 -6.583*** 
 (.159) (.001) 
NCOs .915 2.474 
 (.339) (.116) 
NPLs .873 1.486 
 (.350) (.223) 
I I/AA -.603*** .553*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
OE/OR 1.019 .177 
 (.313) (.674) 
ROAA .955 1.099 
 (.329) (.295) 
ROAE .091 .008 
 (.762) (.928) 
Price/Book .725** 1.158*** 
 (.005) (.001) 
Tier 1 Capital 1.596 .762 
 (.206) (.383) 
LGR .956 .049 
 (.328) (.825) 
Observations 423 427 
Likelihood ratio 21.970 29.589 
P-value .001 .001 
𝑅2 8.7% 11.1% 
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Table 17: Logit Estimates of Mutual Thrifts that Choose MHC over Full Conversion 
Controlling for the Thrift Industry 
Logit estimates of mutual thrifts that choose MHCs over full conversion. To control for the thrift industry, we 
replace ROAA and ROAE with thrift industry adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the mutual thrift chooses MHC and 0 if it chooses full conversion. The year end 
balances for the explanatory variables are prior to the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are 
the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to 
earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as 
the balance of nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets 
(I I/AA) is calculated as total interest income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and 
loans divided average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as 
operating expenses including salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided 
by operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. 
Industry adjusted return on average assets (IAROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average 
total assets at year end less thrift industry ROAA. Industry adjusted returns on average equity (IAROAE) is 
calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end less thrift industry ROAE. Total 
Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. The p-values are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
                  
Intercept  3.671*** 
  (.001) 
NCOs  .133 
  (.715) 
NPLs  1.771 
  (.183) 
I I/AA  -.744*** 
  (.001) 
OE/OR  1.943 
  (.163) 
IAROAA  1.707 
  (.191) 
IAROAE  .992 
  (.319) 
Total Assets  3.459* 
  (.063) 
Observations  315 
Likelihood ratio  22.682 
P-value  .001 
𝑅2  15.8% 
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Table 18: Logit Estimates of MHCs Decision to Undergo Second-Stage Conversion 
Controlling for the Thrift Industry 
Logit estimates of MHCs decision to choose a second-stage conversion. To control for the thrift industry, we replace 
ROAA and ROAE with thrift industry adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the MHC chooses to undergo a second-stage conversion and 0 if it chooses to remain a MHC. 
Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances 
plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at 
year end. Interest income to average assets (I I/AA) is calculated as total interest income including interest and 
dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to 
operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary and benefits expense, office 
occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, 
trading income and other noninterest income. Industry adjusted return on average assets (IAROAA) is calculated as 
annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end less thrift industry ROAA. Industry adjusted 
returns on average equity (IAROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year 
end less thrift industry ROAE. Total Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year 
end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization divided by total book value.  Tier 1 Capital at year 
end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the thrift‟s loan portfolio. The p-values are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.                           
Intercept 1.948 
 (.159) 
NCOs .915 
 (.339) 
NPLs .873 
 (.350) 
I I/AA -.603*** 
 (.001) 
OE/OR 1.019 
 (.313) 
IAROAA .833 
 (.361) 
IAROAE .043 
 (.836) 
Price/Book .725*** 
 (.005) 
Total Assets 1.782 
 (.182) 
Tier 1Capital 1.596 
 (.206) 
LGR .956 
 (.328) 
Observations 161 
Likelihood ratio 73.149 
P-value .001 
𝑅2 49.1% 
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Table 19: Logit Estimates of Publicly Traded Thrifts Acquired Controlling for the Thrift 
Industry 
Logit estimates of publicly traded thrifts that are acquired. To control for the thrift industry, we replace ROAA and 
ROAE with thrift industry adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the publicly traded thrift is acquired and 0 if it is not. The balances for all explanatory are three years following 
the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general 
valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation 
allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and restructured 
loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets (I I/AA) is calculated as total interest 
income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets at year 
end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary and 
benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net 
interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. Industry adjusted return on average assets 
(IAROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end less thrift industry 
ROAA. Industry adjusted returns on average equity (IAROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by 
average total equity at year end less thrift industry ROAE. Total Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total 
assets in thousands at year end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization divided by total book 
value.  Tier 1 Capital at year end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the thrift‟s loan portfolio. 
The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.   
Intercept -2.482*** 
 (.001) 
NCOs 1.058 
 (.304) 
NPLs .101 
 (.751) 
I I/AA 1.711 
 (.191) 
OE/OR .961 
 (.327) 
IAROAA 2.799* 
 (.094) 
IAROAE .468 
 (.494) 
Price/Book .827*** 
 (.001) 
Total Assets 1.501 
 (.221) 
Tier 1Capital 1.781 
 (.182) 
LGR .529 
 (.467) 
Observations 850 
Likelihood ratio 26.673 
P-value .001 
𝑅2 5.2% 
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Table 20: Logit Estimates of Mutual Thrifts that Choose MHC over Full Conversion for 
Portfolios Sorted on Total Assets Controlling for the Thrift Industry 
Logit estimates of mutual thrifts that choose MHCs over full conversion. To control for the thrift industry, we 
replace ROAA and ROAE with thrift industry adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the mutual thrift chooses MHC and 0 if it chooses full conversion. The year end 
balances for the explanatory variables are prior to the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are 
the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to 
earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as 
the balance of nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets 
(I I/AA) is calculated as total interest income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and 
loans divided average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as 
operating expenses including salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided 
by operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. 
Industry adjusted return on average assets (IAROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average 
total assets at year end less thrift industry ROAA. Industry adjusted returns on average equity (IAROAE) is 
calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end less thrift industry ROAE. Total 
Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. The p-values are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.                                                                                  
           Small Mutual Thrifts Large Mutual Thrifts 
Intercept -1.868*** 4.899*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
NCOs 2.431 1.081 
 (.119) (.299) 
NPLs .040 2.705* 
 (.842) (.100) 
I I/AA .051 -.910*** 
 (.821) (.001) 
OE/OR .006 1.739 
 (.941) (.187) 
IAROAA .487 1.079 
 (.485) (.299) 
IAROAE .244 .713 
 (.621) (.398) 
Observations 155 160 
Likelihood ratio NA 22.559 
P-value NA .001 
𝑅2 0% 20.3% 
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Table 21: Logit Estimates of MHCs Decision to Undergo Second-Stage Conversion for 
Portfolios Sorted on Total Assets Controlling for the Thrift Industry 
Logit estimates of MHCs decision to choose a second-stage conversion. To control for the thrift industry, we replace 
ROAA and ROAE with thrift industry adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the MHC chooses to undergo a second-stage conversion and 0 if it chooses to remain a MHC. 
The balances for all explanatory variables are three years following the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total 
loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss 
on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans 
(NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest 
income to average assets (II/AA) is calculated as total interest income including interest and dividends from 
balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues 
(OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary and benefits expense, office occupancy and other 
noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net interest income, fee income, trading income and 
other noninterest income. Industry adjusted return on average assets (IAROAA) is calculated as annualized net 
income divided by average total assets at year end less thrift industry ROAA. Industry adjusted returns on average 
equity (IAROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total equity at year end less thrift 
industry ROAE. Total Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total assets in thousands at year end. Price/Book 
is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization divided by total book value.  Tier 1 Capital at year end. Loan 
growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the thrift‟s loan portfolio. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.                          
                                                           Small MHCs                      Large MHCs 
Intercept -16.868*** 5.835*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
NCOs .947 .001 
 (.330) (.997) 
NPLs .017 -.625* 
 (.897) (.052) 
I I/AA 2.205*** 1.449 
 (.001) (.229) 
OE/OR .482 .880 
 (.488) (.348) 
IAROAA 2.014** 1.042 
 (.016) (.307) 
IAROAE 2.867* 1.928 
 (.090) (.165) 
Price/Book 2.013 -4.366** 
 (.156) (.001) 
Tier 1Capital .022 2.286 
 (.883) (.131) 
LGR .105*** 2.43 
 (.003) (.622) 
Observations 82 79 
Likelihood ratio 40.099 66.255 
P-value .001 .001 
𝑅2 52.7% 76.5% 
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Table 22: Logit Estimates of Publicly Traded Thrifts Acquired for Portfolios Sorted on 
Total Assets Controlling for the Thrift Industry 
Logit estimates of publicly traded thrifts that are acquired. To control for the thrift industry, we replace ROAA and 
ROAE with thrift industry adjusted IAROAA and IAROAE. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the publicly traded thrift is acquired and 0 if it is not.. The balances for all explanatory variables are three years 
following the year of conversion. Net charge-offs to total loans (NCOs) are the amount of loss on assets charged off 
to general valuation allowances plus the amount of loss on assets charged to earnings and provided to specific 
valuation allowances Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs) is calculated as the balance of nonaccrual and 
restructured loans divided by total loans at year end. Interest income to average assets (II/AA) is calculated as total 
interest income including interest and dividends from balances due, securities and loans divided average total assets 
at year end. Operating expenses to operating revenues (OE/OR) is calculated as operating expenses including salary 
and benefits expense, office occupancy and other noninterest expense divided by operating revenues including net 
interest income, fee income, trading income and other noninterest income. Industry adjusted return on average assets 
(IAROAA) is calculated as annualized net income divided by average total assets at year end less thrift industry 
ROAA. Industry adjusted returns on average equity (IAROAE) is calculated as annualized net income divided by 
average total equity at year end less thrift industry ROAE. Total Assets is calculated as the log of the thrift‟s total 
assets in thousands at year end. Price/Book is calculated as ratio is the market capitalization divided by total book 
value.  Tier 1 Capital at year end. Loan growth rate (LGR) is the percentage increase in the thrift‟s loan portfolio. 
The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at .1, .05, or .01 level for two-tailed tests.                       
                                                          Small Thrifts                   Large Thrifts 
Intercept 1.948 -7.541*** 
 (.159) (.001) 
NCOs .915 .600 
 (.339) (.439) 
NPLs .873 1.235 
 (.350) (.266) 
I I/AA -.603*** .616*** 
 (.001) (.001) 
OE/OR 1.019 .136 
 (.313) (.713) 
IAROAA .833 2.739* 
 (.361) (.098) 
IAROAE .043 .077** 
 (.836) (.017) 
Price/Book .725** 1.303*** 
 (.005) (.001) 
Tier 1 Capital 1.596 .263 
 (.206) (.608) 
LGR .956 .178 
 (.328) (.673) 
Observations 423 427 
Likelihood ratio 21.970 29.589 
P-value .001 .001 
𝑅2 8.7% 13.41% 
 
